COMMENT

BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON CONSUMER FINANCIAL ABUSE

DAVID COOPER†
The whistleblower programs that the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank) created within the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) offer large monetary rewards for actionable information. These “bounties”
have attracted commentary from the academy, the bar, and corporate America.
Less often discussed is section 1057 of Dodd–Frank, which creates a private cause of
action for informants who experience retaliation for reporting violations of federal
consumer financial law to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).
These informants could be a valuable tool for discharging the CFPB’s supervisory
and enforcement responsibilities. Unfortunately, the history of whistleblower
protection under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–Oxley) demonstrates
that section 1057 alone is not a viable long-term incentive for insiders to come
forward. Therefore, this Comment argues that Congress or the CFPB should offer
bounties for information that protects consumers’ financial welfare, much as existing
Dodd–Frank programs remunerate individuals who contact law enforcement for
the benefit of investors.
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INTRODUCTION
Las Vegas police found Tracy Lawrence’s body on November 28, 2011,
the day she was scheduled to be sentenced to up to one year of jail time for
notarizing the signature of an individual not in her presence.1 Earlier that
month, Lawrence had tipped off the Attorney General of Nevada to
widespread fraud at Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) (since redubbed
Black Knight Financial Services),2 one of America’s largest loan processors.3
In February 2014, foreclosure-ravaged Nevada became the fiftieth state to
reach a civil settlement with LPS.4
1 Foreclosure Fraud Whistleblower Found Dead, NBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2011, 2:51 PM), http://
usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/11/29/9099162-foreclosure-fraud-whistleblower-found-dead
[hereinafter Foreclosure Fraud], archived at http://perma.cc/7CZB-R8QW.
2 Id.
3 See Ken Ritter, Nevada AG Takes Deal in Lender Fraud Civil Lawsuit, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Feb. 14, 2014, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/nevada-ag-takes-deal-lender-fraud-civil-lawsuit
(describing the allegation that LPS organized a “robo-signing” scheme across various states).
4 Id. Lawrence’s testimony was also the linchpin of hundreds of criminal charges against two
LPS loan officers, but the prosecution fell apart after her suicide. See id. (“A 306-count criminal
case against two Southern California–based loan agents affiliated with the company collapsed a
year ago, after a notary public [Lawrence] who claimed to have witnessed thousands of robosigning
improprieties committed suicide.”).
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LPS’s alleged misconduct consisted of churning out thousands of default
notices with forged signatures and no review.5 Similar allegations underlay
the $25 billion National Mortgage Settlement in February 2012, the “largest
consumer financial protection settlement in United States history.”6 This
settlement was also predicated on information revealed by whistleblowers,
who claimed that a host of banks contracted for illegitimate foreclosure
documents and forged reviewers’ signatures on the paperwork.7
From its earliest days, American law has recognized the utility of enlisting
private citizens as monitors by encouraging them to blow the whistle on
violations of public mandates. 8 Whistleblowing has been discussed and
celebrated largely in the financial fraud context,9 although it also has been
suggested as an enforcement device in other arenas. 10 Whistleblowing
5 See Foreclosure Fraud, supra note 1 (noting that this practice “had thrown into question the
legality of most Las Vegas home foreclosures in the past few years”).
6 The National Mortgage Settlement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 17, 2012, 10:26 AM),
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/consumer_info/nms, archived at http://perma.cc/8RH3FCU7; see also Karen Weise, Mortgage Fraud Whistle-Blower Lynn Szymoniak Exposed Robosigning’s
Sins, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www. businessweek.com/articles/201309-12/mortgage-fraud-whistle-blower-lynn-szymoniak-exposed-robosignings-sins, archived at http://
perma.cc/L9HGF35A (describing one whistleblower’s allegations).
7 See Weise, supra note 6 (noting that the National Mortgage Settlement reserved $228 million
to pay whistleblowers’ qui tam claims).
8 See Stephen M. Kohn, The Whistle-Blowers of 1777, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2011, at A23
(recounting how members of the Continental Navy reported their commodore’s torture of British
sailors, which precipitated the July 1778 enactment of “America’s first whistle-blower protection law”).
9 See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Government
Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1809 (1996) (crediting the False Claims Act’s incentives
for reporting information about fraudulent government contracts with “creat[ing] the most potent
decentralized monitoring system in American public law”); Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes–Oxley’s
Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1141 (describing
how legitimized whistleblowing channels encourage employees to function as “active corporate
monitors”); see also Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards
Corporate Governance by Whistleblowers, 15 NEXUS 55, 61-62 (2010) (arguing that whistleblowing is
better than private litigation at exposing fraud early enough for regulators to minimize its impact
on corporate well-being). But see Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical
Analysis of Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1920 (2007) (claiming that
whistleblowing is ineffective unless “basic institutions of corporate governance” are already
functional); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 43 (2002) (worrying that the “leverage” provided to
employees by antiretaliation protection for securities fraud whistleblowers may disrupt the
workplace).
10 See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376 (2005) (recommending strong whistleblower protection as a
component of effective labor regulation); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower
Protection: A Tale of Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183, 226-28 (2007) (proposing
omnibus whistleblower protection under a wide range of federal statutes, including those
punishing white collar crime and violations of antidiscrimination laws).
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carries an intuitive appeal. Government agencies have limited resources,
cannot afford to bring enforcement actions on the basis of incomplete
information, and can only monitor so many entities effectively. Employees,
by contrast, constantly watch these regulated companies and, as insiders,
may have access to detailed information and key evidence. Convincing such
insiders to report illegality provides supplemental supervision and fosters
efficient enforcement.11 And as the stories of LPS and the National Mortgage
Settlement illustrate, these principles equally apply to the universe of
consumer credit regulation.
Section 1057 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd–Frank) creates antiretaliation protection for employees
of banks, mortgage servicers, payday lenders, debt collectors, and other
consumer financial product or service providers, who blow the whistle on a
violation of federal consumer financial laws or Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) regulations. 12 A robust whistleblowing program would
complement the CFPB’s mandate. Like securities fraud, many violations of
consumer financial protection laws are characterized by hidden information.13 For example, inside information would be valuable in revealing
forbidden kickbacks in the real estate and loan servicing industries, as well
as the wide and vaguely defined world of fraud-like “unfair, deceptive or
abusive act[s] or practice[s]” banned by the CFPB’s organic statute.14
Even where the violation at issue could have been exposed by an agency
investigation, or where specific instances are revealed through consumer
complaints, an inside source could still add value by confirming the systemic
nature of malfeasance and preserving evidence from spoliation—an investigatory impediment that the CFPB can expect to arise more frequently in
11 See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screening Value of Qui Tam,
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1189 (2014) (“Whistle-blowing laws are enacted with the express
purpose of inducing parties with private information about socially costly dishonest or illegal
behavior to come forward to the poorly informed government.”); Alexander Dyck et al., Who
Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2213, 2251 (2010) (examining alleged
corporate frauds in the United States that took place between 1996 and 2004 in companies with
more than 750 million dollars in assets, and concluding that fraud detection relies on several types
of “nontraditional” actors, including employees); James Fisher et al., Privatizing Regulation:
Whistleblowing and Bounty Hunting in the Financial Services Industries, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 117, 129
(2000) (“Whistleblowers conserve government resources by focusing investigations and providing
secret data or keys to understanding available data that otherwise may have been obtained only at an
extremely high cost.”).
12 Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1057, 124 Stat. 1376, 2031-35 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5567 (2012)).
13 See The Identity Crisis at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 100 Banking Rep. (BNA)
1, 3 (Jan. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Identity Crisis] (comparing federal consumer financial law violations
to securities fraud).
14 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012); see also infra notes 41 and 97 and accompanying text.
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those markets, such as payday lending, in which consumer financial activities
have rarely been subjected to federal oversight.15 The CFPB can spur the
evolution of compliance culture in such industries by demonstrating early and
consistent commitment to working with whistleblowers.
However, Dodd–Frank did not institutionalize whistleblowing at the
CFPB in the same way as it did at the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), where the Act created an Office of the Whistleblower to award
bounty payments to qualified informants.16 Therefore, the statute leaves it to
the CFPB to gauge how much infrastructure to develop in order to encourage
reporting and support informants. Because would-be tipsters often stay
silent when they fear no one will act on their reports, the CFPB must
cultivate a reputation for responsiveness in the early days of its nonbank
supervisory activities. Furthermore, the CFPB must ensure that its program
will be prepared to handle an increase in tip volume as the contours of the
CFPB’s authority to prevent “unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or
practice[s]”17 are clarified over time.
In light of the potential effectiveness of consumer financial whistleblowers,
it is discouraging to see the CFPB backpedal on the lone public commitment
it has made to facilitate whistleblowing and to see no further improvements
mentioned in its latest strategic plan.18 Given that the CFPB promises to
maintain informants’ confidentiality, it is possible that no news is good
news, but a historical analogy to Sarbanes–Oxley’s whistleblower provision19
suggests that this is unlikely. That provision, section 806,20 did not incentivize
whistleblowing due to the persistent impotence of its antiretaliation cause
of action.21

15 See Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Remarks at the Brookings Institute
(Jan. 5, 2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/1/05%20cordray/0105_
cordray_remarks.pdf (“[The CFPB] will begin dealing face-to-face with [nonbank institutions,
such as] payday lenders, mortgage servicers, mortgage originators, private student lenders, and
other firms that often compete with banks but have largely escaped any meaningful federal
oversight.”).
16 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (2012) (authorizing the SEC to pay an award, ranging from ten
to thirty percent of the amount collected, to individuals who voluntarily provided original
information to the SEC that led to a successful enforcement action).
17 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012).
18 See, e.g., infra Section II.B (recounting the CFPB’s apparent abandonment of its
announced intention to create a web portal for whistleblower tips).
19 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 124 Stat. 745, 802-04 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012)).
20 Id.
21 See infra Section III.A (describing statutory and judicial obstacles for plaintiff whistleblowers
relying on section 806 to protect themselves against retaliation from employers).
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The regulatory scheme surrounding Sarbanes–Oxley section 806
requires whistleblowers to present complaints to the Department of Labor’s
(DOL) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) before
going to court.22 If OSHA finds a claim meritless, the whistleblower can
appeal first to a DOL administrative law judge (ALJ), then to the Administrative Review Board (ARB), and finally to a federal court.23 Dodd–Frank’s
section 1057 includes an identical exhaustion requirement.24 Throughout the
Bush II administration, the DOL was notoriously hostile to Sarbanes–
Oxley whistleblowers. 25 ALJs strictly policed the requirements of the
Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 regulations,26 while the ARB invented a series
of new prerequisites to Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 claims—for example, a
requirement that the fraud reported be “material” for section 806 to cover
the reporting employee.27
Whereas the CFPB’s insulation from both Congress and the President
makes it well-suited to maintain a commitment to whistleblowers, the
DOL’s priorities are far more susceptible to the vagaries of the political
branches, as the agency’s track record with Sarbanes–Oxley section 806
attests. Dodd–Frank’s section 1057 will be similarly undependable in the
long term if its effectiveness depends on the DOL.
Even if Congress is unwilling to remove the DOL exhaustion requirement
from Dodd–Frank’s section 1057 for fear of frivolous litigation, Congress
could provide whistleblowers with a dependable incentive by means of a
financial reward regime akin to the programs for securities, commodities,
22
23
24
25

29 C.F.R. § 1980.103 (2014).
Id. §§ 1980.105-7, .109-10, .112.
12 U.S.C. § 5567(c) (2012).
See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1773
(2007) (suggesting that because Sarbanes–Oxley offers a weak incentive for whistleblowers, they
should be paid financial rewards derived from fees levied on all exchange-listed companies);
Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes–Oxley
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 91 tbl.1 (2007) (finding that only 3.6% of
the cases resolved at the initial OSHA investigation were decided in favor of employees and that
employees prevailed 6.5% of the time at the ALJ level).
26 See Meghan Elizabeth King, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd–Frank Amendments: The Case
Against the New Amendments to Whistleblower Protection in Section 806 of Sarbanes–Oxley, 48 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1457, 1471 (2011) (observing that “ALJs [we]re very firm in enforcing th[e] ninetyday deadline” for whistleblowers to file a complaint with OSHA); see also Beverley H. Earle &
Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection Under Sarbanes–Oxley: A Proposal for
Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 52 (2007) (arguing that there is no policy justification for discouraging
whistleblowers from coming forward after the ninety-day statute of limitations expires).
27 See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes–Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L.
REV. 1, 32-33 (2012) (recounting the ARB’s determination that the reported fraud must be
“‘material,’ as defined by securities laws to mean information ‘that a reasonable shareholder would
consider important in deciding how to vote’”).
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futures, options, and derivatives whistleblowers under Dodd–Frank. In the
absence of legislative action, this Comment argues that the CFPB should
use its rulemaking power to achieve the same result.
I begin by outlining the structure and objectives of the CFPB, as well as
the protection its organic statute creates for whistleblowers. Next, I explain
why the development of a vigorous consumer financial whistleblower
scheme deserves more attention than it currently receives from the CFPB.
After pointing out the crucial weakness in the existing incentive for informants
by comparing Dodd–Frank section 1057 to Sarbanes–Oxley section 806, I
conclude by arguing for a bounty system and discussing concerns related to
implementing such a system.
I. THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION ACT OF 2010
Adopting a proposal originally advanced by Senator Elizabeth Warren,28
Title X of the Dodd–Frank Act (the Consumer Financial Protection Act of
2010, or the CFPA)29 established what amounts to a Consumer Product
Safety Commission for the credit market: the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection (CFPB, or the Bureau).30 One provision of the CFPA, Dodd–Frank
section 1057, 31 prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers who report
violations of the Bureau’s regulations or the statutes it administers. Coupled
with the CFPB’s structural independence, section 1057 creates the possibility
for a potent consumer financial whistleblower program.
A. The Powerful and Insulated CFPB
The Bureau consolidates the consumer financial responsibilities of seven
preexisting agencies: the Department of Housing and Urban Development
28 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 98
(2008) (advocating for the creation of a Financial Product Safety Commission); Elizabeth Warren,
Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007, at 17 (proposing the creation of a Financial
Product Safety Commission to protect consumers from “hidden tricks” in financial products); see
also David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act
of 2009 on Consumer Credit, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 277, 310-11 (2010) (surveying the
“intellectual case” for the CFPB).
29 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit.
X, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955-2113 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
30 See generally Lydia DePillis, A Watchdog Grows Up: The Inside Story of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, WASH. POST WONKBLOG ( Jan. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/11/a-watchdog-grows-up-the-inside-story-of-the-consumer-financialprotection-bureau, archived at http://perma.cc/8DRL-4YJB (outlining the CFPB’s three-year
history).
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(HUD); the Federal Trade Commission (FTC); the now-defunct Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS); and the four “prudential regulators,”32 namely
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), 33 the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union
Association (NCUA), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC).34 It oversees extensions of credit, loan servicing, real estate settlement
services and appraisals, deposit-taking activities, financial data processing,
the collection of consumer credit history and debt, and numerous other
financial products and services35 that are “offered or provided for use by
consumers primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”36 The
statute terms such subject matter “consumer financial product[s] or
service[s].”37
The Bureau’s mandate requires it to implement and enforce “Federal
consumer financial law,” 38 a term that encompasses the CFPA itself,
eighteen “enumerated consumer laws,”39 and rules or orders the Bureau
issues pursuant to those authorities. 40 Under the CFPA, the Bureau is
empowered to define and prevent “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or
practices” (UDAAPs) related to the classes of consumer financial services
described above.41 The “enumerated consumer laws” the CFPB administers
include the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA), the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975
(HMDA), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA),
and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).42

32
33

12 U.S.C. § 5581(c) (2012).
Although the CFPB is housed within the Federal Reserve, it is “essentially an independent
executive agency.” DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD–
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 106 (2011). The FRB has no authority to
control CFPB officers or review CFPB rules and orders. See 12 U.S.C. § 5492(c)(2) (2012)
(limiting the power of the FRB over the CFPB).
34 See 12 U.S.C. § 5581 (2012) (listing functions from other agencies that have been transferred
to the CFPB).
35 Id. § 5481(15) (defining “financial product or service”).
36 Id. § 5481(5)(A).
37 Id. For convenience, the remainder of this Comment refers interchangeably to “consumer
financial products” and “consumer financial services.”
38 Id. § 5511(a).
39 Id. § 5481(12).
40 Id. § 5481(14).
41 See id. § 5531(a) (conferring authority to prevent UDAAPs); id. § 5531(b) (conferring
authority to identify UDAAPs through notice and comment rulemaking).
42 See id. § 5481(12) (enumerating the eighteen consumer laws).
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The CFPB oversees both “covered person[s]” that offer consumer financial
products, and entities that provide financial services to covered persons.43
This class of covered persons includes many depository institutions already
subject to oversight by the prudential regulators.44 The CFPB has primary
rulemaking and enforcement authority over federal consumer financial law
as applied to depositories with more than $10 billion in assets and affiliates
of such depositories.45
The Bureau is also authorized to supervise nondepository institutions
that offer certain types of consumer financial products, including payday
lenders, debt collectors, and residential mortgage brokers, originators, and
servicers.46 The CFPB is the first federal regulator responsible for monitoring
most of these “nonbanks.”47 Moreover, the Bureau can bring administrative
actions and civil suits against an entity that it does not supervise, such as
smaller participants in another consumer financial services market, if that
entity violates the federal consumer financial laws.48

43
44

See id. § 5481(6) (defining “covered person”).
The CFPB’s regulations still apply to smaller depositories, but the prudential regulators
retain primary supervisory and enforcement authority over such institutions. See id. § 5516(d)
(describing the role of prudential regulators). However, if such an institution is “a service provider
to a substantial number” of entities over which the CFPB has primary enforcement authority, that
authority also extends to the service provider. Id. § 5516(e). Monitoring “safety and soundness”
also remains the purview of the prudential regulators. See Memorandum of Understanding on
Supervisory Coordination, May 16, 2012, at 4 n.6, available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201206_CFPB_MOU_Supervisory_Coordination.pdf (listing examples of examination subject
matters that fall outside the range of the Bureau’s supervisory activities).
45 See 12 U.S.C. § 5515 (2012) (conferring supervision and enforcement authority over “very
large banks, savings associations, and credit unions”); see also id. § 5512(a) (conferring rulemaking
authority over federal consumer financial law). But see id. § 5517 (limiting the Bureau’s authority
over, inter alia, accountants, attorneys, retail brokers, and insurance companies).
46 See id. § 5514(a)(1)(A) (providing for CFPB supervision of all mortgage originators,
brokers, and servicers, and those who engage in loan modification or foreclosure relief related to
mortgages); id. § 5514(a)(1)(D) (providing for the same supervision by the CFPB for private
education lenders); id. § 5514(a)(1)(E) (providing for the same supervision by the CFPB for
payday lenders); see also id. § 5514(a)(1)(B) (permitting the CFPB to supervise “larger participants[,]”
as defined through rulemaking in consultation with the FTC). “To date, the [CFPB] has issued
three rules defining larger participants in the following markets: consumer reporting (effective
September 2012), debt collection (effective January 2013), and student loan servicing (effective
March 2014).” CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS 4 (2013), available
at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201401_cfpb_supervisory-highlights-winter-2013.pdf.
47 See Cordray, supra note 15 (explaining that the CFPB was created to “protect [consumers]
against fraud” and to “ensure that they are treated fairly in the financial marketplace”).
48 See 12 U.S.C. § 5563(a) (2012) (authorizing the CFPB to conduct administrative hearings
and adjudication proceedings); id. § 5564(a) (permitting the CFPB to bring such civil actions).
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Together with its expansive jurisdiction 49 and array of enforcement
tools, 50 the CFPB has several structural features designed to make it
uniquely resistant to capture. The Bureau is shielded from both congressional
and presidential influence because it is funded by a fixed percentage transfer
from the FRB51 rather than by the appropriations process;52 its rulemakings
are not subject to review by the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA);53 and its sole director serves a five-year term and can be
removed only for cause.54 The CFPB can also “bring its own actions in
federal court without having to go through the Department of Justice.”55
The CFPB’s wealth of influence and dearth of political accountability
continues to inspire energetic criticism.56 For example, on February 27,
49 The CFPA also empowered the state attorneys general to enforce CFPB regulations
issued under the Act, even against market participants the CFPB has no jurisdiction over. See
CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 13.2.6 (8th ed.
2012) (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5515(a)(c), 5552(a) (2012)) (“For example, state attorneys general, but
not the CFPB, can enforce CFPB rules against banks, thrifts, and credit unions with assets under
$10 billion.”). The state attorney general must give the Bureau notice, and the Bureau has the right
to intervene and remove the action to federal court. 12 U.S.C. § 5552(b) (2012).
50 Including, for example, the ability to issue Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs) before
pursuing an investigation. See 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6 (2014) (governing CID procedure).
51 See 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (requiring the FRB to provide the CFPB with
twelve percent of its budget from fiscal year 2013 onward). It is worth noting that, like the other
banking regulators, the Federal Reserve enjoys an income stream unmoored from the appropriations
process. See id. § 243 (empowering the Board of Governors to satisfy the Federal Reserve’s
operating budget through semiannual assessments of Federal Reserve banks).
52 The CFPB director was also authorized to request up to $200 million in additional appropriated
funds each fiscal year if he determined that the Bureau was underfunded, but that authorization
expired at the beginning of fiscal year 2014. Id. § 5497(e)(1)-(2).
53 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (2012) (exempting independent regulatory agencies from the definition of “agency”
for the purposes of OIRA review); see also 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2006) (defining “independent
regulatory agency” to include the FRB).
54 See 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(1) (2012) (establishing the director’s position); id. § 5491(c)(1)
(providing for five-year term); id. § 5491(c)(3) (providing for-cause removal for the director).
55 Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89
TEX. L. REV. 15, 78 (2010) (citing Dodd–Frank Act § 1054(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5564(b)
(2012))).
56 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to Undermine
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 889-90, 900 (2011–2012)
(discussing the financial services industry’s campaign against the CFPB); David Francis, Critics
Say Consumer Bureau Is an Overreaching Monster, FISCAL TIMES (May 30, 2013),
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/05/30/Critics-Say-Consumer-Bureau-is-anOverreaching-Monster, archived at http://perma.cc/S44F-44YN (describing accusations leveled at
the CFPB by Republican senators and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce); see also Evans & Wright,
supra note 28, at 280 (labeling the CFPB a paternalistic “supernanny” agency); Todd Zywicki, The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 900-01 (2013)
(accusing the CFPB of bureaucratically undermining its own mission to encourage simplicity in
consumer finance).
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2014, the House of Representatives passed the Consumer Financial Freedom
and Washington Accountability Act, H.R. 3193, 57 a bill that would replace
the CFPB’s Federal Reserve–derived funding with a yearly appropriation.58
In expressing his support for the bill, House Financial Services Committee
Chairman Representative Jeb Hensarling referred to the CFPB as
“[a]rguably. . . the single most powerful and least accountable Federal
agency in the history of our nation.”59
H.R. 3193 is just one recent installment in the long-running efforts to
disarm the CFPB.60 The agency was under attack before it got off the
ground.61 Perhaps this is not surprising, given that “[u]nlike any other part
of the Dodd–Frank Act, the Consumer Bureau . . . serve[s] as a

57
58

Consumer Financial Freedom and Washington Accountability Act, H.R. 3193, 113th Cong. (2014).
See Charles S. Clark, House Passes Bill to Revamp Consumer Agency, GOV’T EXECUTIVE
(Mar. 3, 2014), available at http://www.govexec.com/management/2014/03/house-passes-bill-revampconsumer-agency/79735 (describing the proposed reform H.R. 3193 to increase accountability).
59 Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., House to Consider CFPB Accountability
Reforms This Week (Feb. 24, 2014), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=371067.
60 See Susan Block-Lieb, Accountability and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,
7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25, 40-41 (2012) (describing earlier bills offered by Republican
lawmakers as symbolic calls for increased oversight of the CFPB).
61 For example, now-Senator Elizabeth Warren, the natural choice to head the CFPB, was
removed from consideration in the face of vociferous Republican opposition. See Eric W. Dolan,
Larry Summers Helped Sink Elizabeth Warren’s Nomination to Head New Consumer Bureau, RAW
STORY (Aug. 7, 2013, 8:57 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/08/07/larry-summers-helpedsink-elizabeth-warrens-nomination-to-head-new-consumer-bureau, archived at http://perma.cc/
R5Z3-TV4W (identifying opposition to Senator Warren’s nomination). More than a year passed
between current Director Richard Cordray’s recess appointment in January 2012 and his Senate
confirmation. See Mary Beth Quirk, Senate Finally Confirms Richard Cordray as CFPB Director,
CONSUMERIST (July 16, 2013), http://consumerist.com/2013/07/16/senate-finally-confirms-richardcordray-as-cfpb-director, archived at http://perma.cc/G9GN-GDWV (congratulating Cordray on
the “66-34 vote that finally confirmed him”). In fact, the legitimacy of the CFPB as a whole
remains an open question, as a case challenging the constitutionality of the structural features
outlined above is pending before the D.C. Circuit. See Final Opening Brief for the State
Appellants, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, Nos. 13-5247 & 13-5248 (D.C. Cir. May 12,
2014), ECF No. 45; Final Opening Brief of Private Plaintiffs–Appellants, State Nat’l Bank of Big
Spring v. Lew, Nos. 13-5247 & 13-5248 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 2014), ECF No. 47; Final Brief for
Appellees, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, Nos. 13-5247 & 13-5248 (D.C. Cir. May 9, 2014),
ECF No. 44; see also State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127, 165 (D.D.C.
2013) (finding that the plaintiff, a national bank, had not suffered cognizable injury-in-fact from the
CFPB’s activities and therefore lacked standing to challenge the Bureau’s structure). Director
Cordray, for his part, appears to be unfazed. See Richard Cordray, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director Richard Cordray at the National Association of Attorneys
General (Feb. 26, 2014), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/
prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-richard-cordray-at-the-national-association-of-attorneys-general
(“This regime will govern the mortgage servicing market—including both the banks and their
nonbank competitors—in perpetuity.”).
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counterweight . . . limit[ing] the kinds of strategies that the largest banks
can use to make profits.”62 That said, the CFPB’s conduct on the job has
done little to mollify the consumer financial industry’s misgivings. Its
tenure so far has been colored by aggression and a strong preference for
regulating through informal guidance and enforcement actions, as opposed
to notice-and-comment rulemaking.63 In particular, regulated entities have
called for rulemakings to address the definition of “unfair, deceptive, or
abusive acts or practices” under the CFPA.64
B. Section 1057
In contrast to its supervision and enforcement actions, the CFPB’s
whistleblower protections—one of its most interesting weapons—have been
largely overlooked. Dodd–Frank Act section 1057 prohibits retaliation
against a covered employee who, among other protected activities, reports
what she reasonably believes to be a violation of federal consumer law, a
CFPB regulation, or a CFPB order.65 The statute creates a private right of
action for an employee who suffers retaliation for reporting wrongdoing to
her employer, the CFPB, or another law enforcement agency.66
Section 1057’s coverage is broad. It includes not only any employer who
offers consumer financial products, but also employers who provide services
to such offerors, even if the offeror does not control the service provider.67
62
63

SKEEL, supra note 33, at 114.
See, e.g., Martin Bishop, Regulatory: Collaborating to Solve the Vexing UDAAP Dilemma,
INSIDECOUNSEL (May 1, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/05/01/regulatory-collaboratingto-solve-the-vexing-udaap, archived at http://perma.cc/UFJ4-7TDL (providing one attorney’s
opinions on why the CFPB should engage in rulemaking).
64 Id.
65 See 12 U.S.C. § 5567(b)-(c) (2012) (defining the term “covered employee” as “any
individual performing tasks related to the offering or provision of a consumer financial product or
service,” and delineating categories of protected conduct).
66 See id. § 5567(a) (banning any “covered person or service provider” from retaliating
against any “covered employee” for protected conduct). The statute also protects employees who
“filed, instituted, or caused to be filed” any federal consumer financial law “proceeding,” id. § 5567
(a)(1)(3), which theoretically shelters an employee who blows the whistle to an affected consumer
or to an enterprising plaintiff’s attorney.
67 12 U.S.C. § 5567(a)(1)(3); see also id. § 5481(6) (defining “covered person” to include offerors
of consumer products and “any affiliate” who “acts as a service provider to such [offerors]”); id.
§ 5481(26) (defining “service provider” as “any person that provides a material service to a covered
person in connection with the offering . . . of a consumer financial product”(emphasis added)).
This range is especially significant because the CFPB has stressed its intention to hold supervised
entities liable for the malfeasance of third-party service providers. See CFPB to Hold Financial
Institutions and their Service Providers Accountable, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-to-hold-financialinstitutions-and-their-service-providers-accountable, archived at http://perma.cc/JK8N-KVPW
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Moreover, Dodd–Frank section 1057 governs conduct that other federal
whistleblower statutes, including the False Claims Act (FCA) and the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA),
leave unregulated. The FCA allows relators to bring a qui tam68 lawsuit on
the government’s behalf if they detect a fraudulent “request or demand” for
federal assets. 69 Although the FCA therefore reaches some consumer
finance cases that involve government initiatives such as the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 70 “[u]nfortunately, many
banking [and] mortgage cases are not tied to any demand or request for
money,” much less federal money.71 Similarly, because mortgage services
are often provided by nonbank institutions, FIRREA’s whistleblower
provisions also have limited applicability to this field; the statute only
covers the conduct of federally insured depositories. 72 Neither federal

(outlining the CFPB’s “expectation that supervised financial institutions have an effective process
for managing the risks of service provided relationships,” and recommending that “supervised
financial institutions take steps to ensure that business arrangements with service providers do not
present unwarranted risks to consumers”); see also Marie-Charlotte Patterson, Spotlight on the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, INSIDECOUNSEL (June 7, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.
com/2013/06/07/spotlight-on-the-consumer-financial-protection-bur, archived at http://perma.cc/
MNJ-56U7 (arguing that the key challenge the CFPB poses is understanding potential liability for
suppliers and subcontractors).
68 “Qui tam” is an abbreviation of “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,”
which means “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1444 (10th ed. 2014). In modern usage, it refers to “[a]n action brought under a
statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of which the government or some
specified public institution will receive.” Id.
69 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(b)(2), 3729(c), 3730(b) (2012). The Department of Justice (DOJ) may
opt to join the relator’s suit, but the relator can proceed without government intervention. Id.
§ 3730(c)(3). The relator is entitled to a percentage of any successful recovery, which varies
depending on whether the DOJ intervenes. See id. § 3730(d)(1)-(2) (awarding fifteen to twentyfive percent of the claim proceeds to the relator in government-joined actions and twenty-five to
thirty percent of proceeds in actions in which the government does not join).
70 See Jessica Dye, Whistleblower Says BofA Defrauded HAMP, REUTERS, Mar. 7, 2012, available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/08/bank-of-america-whistleblower-idUSL2E8E804820120308
(reporting on an FCA whistleblower complaint alleging fraud under the HAMP filed by a former
employee of Urban Lending Solutions, a company that performed contract work for Bank of
America and its loan servicing subsidiary).
71 THAD M. GUYER & MELISSA KOVEN, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, BANKING
SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY: UNDERSTANDING AND HANDLING THE COMPLEX “SOX PLUS
ONE” WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIM 16 (2013) (citing Order, United States v. Countrywide Fin.
Corp., No. 12-1422 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2013)), available at http://www.whistleblower.org/
sites/default/files/BSA.pdf (pointing out that the Southern District of New York dismissed the
FCA claims in a suit related to Countrywide’s fraud on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
72 12 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (2012); see also Brian Mahany, Mortgage Servicers Ripe for Whistleblowers,
DUE DILIGENCE (Mar. 2, 2014, 2:37 AM), http://www.mahanyertl.com/mahanyertl/2014/
mortgage-servicers-ripe-whistleblowers, archived at http://perma.cc/C8FX-GHH8 (explaining the
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statute covers the market segments for which CFPB enforcement authority
generally represents a first taste of federal oversight, such as payday lending.
And state law in this area is predictably patchwork.73
Although it casts a commendably wide net, Dodd–Frank section 1057 is
more notable for what it fails to do. The provision stands apart from the
two other sets of whistleblower protections in the Dodd–Frank Act. Section
922 provides incentives and protections for individuals who report violations
of federal securities laws to the SEC.74 Another section, Section 924 of
Dodd–Frank, directs the SEC to establish an Office of the Whistleblower
(OWB) to administer this new informant program.75 Section 748 creates a
similar program for tips regarding the federal commodities and futures
statutes, and the associated regulations provide for a “Whistleblower Office”
(WBO) within the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).76
Both the CFTC program’s statute and its regulations substantially mirror
those of the SEC.77
Despite their similarities, the programs created under sections 748 and
922 differ from section 1057’s scheme in several important respects. First,
whistleblowers who relay original information to the CFTC or SEC are
statutorily entitled to between ten to thirty percent of any recovery the
agency attains based on that information, provided that the recovery
exceeds $1 million.78 Section 1057 does not provide for a similar bounty
payment. Second, and more germane to the immediate point, Dodd–Frank
section 1057 does not establish a unit within the CFPB equivalent to the
SEC’s OWB or the CFTC’s WBO for collecting tips. The CFPB has
discretion over how much infrastructure to assemble around this modest
incentive for consumer financial whistleblowers.

difficulties of bringing whistleblower claims against nonbank mortgage servicers like Ocwen or
Green Tree, two companies that the CFPB has targeted).
73 See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, States of Pay: Emerging Trends in State Whistleblower Bounty
Schemes, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 53, 70-71 (2012) (surveying state false claims laws).
74 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
75 Id. § 78u-7.
76 7 U.S.C. § 26 (2012) (creating the commodities informant program); 17 C.F.R. § 165.15(c)
(2014) (delegating authority for most informant-related action to the head of the WBO).
77 Compare 17 C.F.R. pt. 165 (2014) (codifying final CFTC bounty rules), with id. § 240.21F
(codifying final SEC bounty rules). But see Douglas J. Davison et al., CFTC and SEC Whistleblower
Bounties: Largely Similar but Important Differences Remain, 13 J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 36, 37
(2012) (enumerating a series of fine-grained but “notable differences” between the programs,
including the CFTC’s failure to mirror the SEC’s ban on duplicative recovery).
78 7 U.S.C. § 26(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012).
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II. WHISTLEBLOWING UNDER FEDERAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL LAW
Developing this type of infrastructure for collecting tips would be a
worthwhile investment. Although pursuing whistleblower tips is a reactive
style of enforcement, the CFPB is already designed to respond to external
complaints from angry consumers—so why not respond to complaints from
members of the consumer financial services industry who might have inside
information on developing species of deception and abuse?79 Many of these
federal consumer financial law violations resemble fraud, which whistleblowers
have proven to be helpful in exposing.80 Nevertheless, the CFPB does not
currently devote substantial resources to facilitating such tips.
A. The Potential Value of Consumer Financial Services Informants
Over a decade after the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals and
subsequent passage of Sarbanes–Oxley, corporate financial fraud is still the
iconic violation Americans associate with whistleblowers.81 And rightly so,
perhaps: from August 2011 through the close of the 2014 fiscal year, the
SEC’s new OWB received 1714 whistleblower tips related to “corporate
disclosures and financials,” comprising 16.8% of the office’s 10,193 complaints
and making this complaint category the most common type of allegation
reported.82
Turning to utility rather than volume, studies indicate that insider tips
play a vital role in detecting fraud at large companies.83 The underlying
dynamic at work here is not limited to situations where someone is cooking
79 See CARTER ET AL., supra note 49, § 4.3.3.1 (“It is impossible to frame definitions which
embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all
known practices were specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin
over again.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.))).
80 See supra note 19.
81 See Adam Geller, The Whistleblower’s Unending Story, USA TODAY (Apr. 26, 2008, 12:24
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-04-26-3579244419_x.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/4VSQ-ERTS (recalling the scandals of 2002, which the press dubbed as “the year
of the whistleblower”).
82 SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM 20, 27 (2014) [hereinafter OWB ANNUAL REPORT]. “Offering fraud” came in a close
second at 1599 tips, or 15.7%. Id.
83 See Dyck et. al., supra note 11, at 2226 (noting that, compared to other potential “fraud
detectors,” employees of a company frequently act as whistleblowers, reporting fraud in 17% of the
instances studied); see also ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS
ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2010 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 16 (2010), available at
http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/documents/rttn-2010.pdf (finding
that tips were responsible for detecting over 40% of the organizational fraud reported by
examiners from 2008 to 2010).
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the books. Whistleblowers are valuable whenever a violation puts an
enforcer at an informational disadvantage—that is, whenever a violation
involves hidden information.84
The discovery of hidden information characterizes many prosecutions
for violations of federal consumer financial law.85 One example that recently
garnered nationwide attention in the foreclosure context is the practice of
“robo-signing,” or directing employees to rubber-stamp documents without
meaningful review. 86 Whistleblowers could also be useful in exposing
arrangements that violate the RESPA’s prohibition on kickbacks, a subject
of increasing CFPB attention,87 or the TILA’s ban on “steering incentives.”88
A former SEC enforcement attorney who was among the Bureau’s earliest
hires89 has observed that the CFPA’s generalized ban on UDAAPs charges
the CFPB with preventing yet another range of acts which shares much in
common with securities fraud.90 And, to name a final example, the CFPA’s

84 See Casey & Niblett, supra note 11, at 1208 (“Our analysis suggests that when there are
sticky asymmetric information problems—which is, of course, the definition of hidden information—the screening mechanism is important.”).
85 The CFPB has admittedly found ways to enforce other statutes without requiring inside
information. For example, the Bureau has come under fire from House Republicans for using its
finding that auto lenders violated ECOA’s and Regulation B’s prohibition on discriminatory
lending, arrived at by means of a disparate-impact theory and undisclosed methods of analysis, to
force the lenders into high-value settlements. See Letter from Jeb Hensarling, Chairman, House
Comm. on Fin. Servs., to Hon. Richard Cordray, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. (Mar. 7,
2014), available at http://images.magnetmail.net/images/clients/CBA_/attach/IndirectAutoLending
Letter3142014.pdf (detailing congressional efforts, beginning in May 2013, to get the CFPB to
disclose the details of “the methodology the [CFPB] has adopted to determine whether fair
lending violations exist in indirect auto lending” and threatening to invoke the House Committee’s
compulsory process to obtain this information).
86 See Complaint at 13, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 13-2025
(D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2013) (defining “robo-signing” as “preparing, executing, notarizing, and filing
affidavits . . . whose affiants lacked personal knowledge of the assertions in the affidavits and did
not review any information or documentation to verify the assertions in such affidavits”); see also
supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing settlement of a case involving forged reviewer
signatures).
87 See Brad Finkelstein, Former FHA Chief: RESPA Enforcement on the Way, NAT’L MORTGAGE
NEWS (Mar. 16, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/dailybriefing/2010_560/
stricter-enforcement-respa-1029390-1.html?site=default_on, archived at http://perma.cc/B8NC-QUUP
(quoting former Federal Housing Administration Commissioner Brian Montgomery as anticipating
an uptick in RESPA enforcement “now that the CFPB has purview” over the statute).
88 See 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c) (2012) (barring loan originators from paying loan officers or
brokers compensation that varies based on loan terms other than the size of the principal).
89 Professionals: Ronald L. Rubin, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, http://www.hunton.com/
ronald_rubin (last visited Jan. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7JUJ-EMDF.
90 See Identity Crisis, supra note 13, at 3 (arguing that the CFPB shares more in common with
the SEC than with the prudential regulators or FTC, in part because both agencies’ enforcement
investigations target “fraudulent conduct” or “close relatives of fraudulent conduct,” namely
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ban on originating loans without an evaluation of the borrowers’ ability to
repay raises the possibility of loan officers reporting abuses similar to
robosigning.91
The deeper and more deliberately buried the violation, the greater the
value added by an inside source. But whistleblowers can be a useful supervisory
supplement even when the information they report could have been
exposed by a government investigation. 92 CFPB examiners cannot be
omnipresent, and the CFPB can examine only the largest depository
institutions “on a continuing basis.”93 Moreover, even when the CFPB does
engage in supervisory action, its detection of even relatively poorly concealed
violations suffers from a problem with which the SEC is familiar: CFPB
enforcement attorneys no longer accompany examiners during supervisory
exams.94

“unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices,” that are banned in “very general terms” by their
respective organic statutes).
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1), (a)(3) (2012) (requiring evaluation of ability to repay for loans
other than qualified mortgages); see also JOSEPH L. BARLOON ET AL., SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROVISIONS IN THE DODD–FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 14, available at http://www.skadden.com/
newsletters/FSR_A_Consumer_Protection_Provisions_in_Dodd–Frank.pdf (noting employers’
concern regarding the relationship between section 1057 and the ability to repay rule).
92 See Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public
Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1159 (“Although an agency could
obtain the same information [as provided by an informant], it would likely come at significant
investigatory cost.”).
93 Peggy Twohig & Steve Antonakes, A Guide to CFPB’s Supervision, CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/guide-cfpb-supervision,
archived at http://perma.cc/YU2K-9YWV.
94 The CFPB used to send enforcement attorneys to on-site examinations, but after supervised
interests protested the practice’s potential to impede “free exchange during the examination,” the
Bureau changed its policy. CFPB OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE, FY2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
DIRECTOR 13 (Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201211_Ombuds_Office_Annual_Report.pdf; CFPB OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE, FY2013 ANNUAL
REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR 13-14 (Nov. 15, 2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201311_cfpb_annual-report_ombuds-office.pdf. Matthew Martens, a former SEC enforcement
attorney who led the insider trading case against Goldman’s “Fabulous Fab,” has spoken critically
of the Commission’s comparable “bifurcation of the investigative process.” See Ben Protess, For
S.E.C., a Much-Needed Win, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2014, at B1 (pointing to the “bureaucratic
hurdles” presented by excluding enforcement attorneys from SEC investigations as one reason for
the agency’s struggles at trial in the period leading up to the Tourre verdict). As described in
subsection IV.A.2 infra, properly incentivized consumer financial services whistleblowers can help
enforcement staff compensate for this division and the resulting limits on the staff’s ability to
investigate.
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B. Is Anybody Listening?
In sum, section 1057 and the CFPB’s broad mandate create the desirable
possibility of many covered employees coming forward with tips. However,
the concern that their tip will not inspire a vigorous response deters many
would-be whistleblowers from reporting to law enforcement. 95 Most
informants also fear being perceived as “crazy” and therefore are less likely
to report when the misconduct they observe is not definitively illegal.96
Both of these fears should be mitigated over time as the CFPB clarifies the
contours of the “unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or practice[s]”97 its
organic statute prohibits, and as regulated employees become more familiar
with the Bureau’s energetic brand of enforcement. But an uptick in tips will
be counterproductive if the Bureau is not prepared and loses its reputation
for responsiveness.
What has the CFPB done for whistleblowers so far? In terms of publically
disclosed activity, the answer is not much. The Bureau issued a bulletin and
press release informing the public of Dodd–Frank section 1057 in late
2011.98 Since then, the CFPB has made no observable effort to leverage the
provision. There are no references to whistleblowing in the Bureau’s
strategic plan through 2017, and the Bureau has not promulgated any
regulations or taken any public enforcement actions related to section
1057.99

95 See Orly Lobel, Linking Prevention, Detection, and Whistleblowing: Principles for Designing
Effective Reporting Systems, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 37, 48 (2012) (“Perhaps most importantly, individuals
will choose to remain bystanders in the face of misconduct if they believe that their reporting will
not be treated seriously.” (citations omitted)); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection:
Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes–Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L.
REV. 91, 104 (2007) (describing whistleblowers’ fear of bureaucratic indifference); see also Fisher et
al., supra note 11, at 130 (arguing that faith in law enforcement’s propensity to follow up actionable
information is one of the “most important” ways to encourage whistleblowing).
96 Rapp, supra note 95, at 122-23.
97 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012).
98 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. NO. 2011-05 (ENFORCEMENT AND
FAIR LENDING), BUREAU INVITES WHISTLEBLOWER INFORMATION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT TIPS AND HIGHLIGHTS ANTI-RETALIATION PROTECTIONS (2011), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/12/CFPB_Enforcement_Bulletin_12-15-11.pdf (fleshing out
statutory whistleblower protections in greater detail); Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
CFPB Begins Taking Whistleblower Tips (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.
consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-begins-taking-whistleblower-tips
(announcing the option to anonymously report via telephone hotline or email and outlining
consumer whistleblowers’ cause of action for retaliation).
99 See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN, BUDGET, AND
PERFORMANCE PLAN AND REPORT (Mar. 2014), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
strategic-plan-budget-and-performance-plan-and-report.pdf (lacking any mention of whistleblowers).
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At least one prominent attorney for consumer financial service providers
was skeptical of the Bureau’s ability to attract substantial numbers of
informants from the outset. 100 That skepticism proved warranted. The
CFPB appears to have abandoned its only stated plan for drawing in more
tips. A 2011 press release claimed that the CFPB planned to introduce an
“online tips portal accessible through its website” in early 2012.101 Two years
later, the “Whistleblowers” tab on consumerfinance.gov links to a CFPB
blog page resembling the CFPB’s 2011 press release, but it makes no
mention of plans for a web portal.102
Given the utility of a robust consumer financial whistleblower program,
why is the unfulfilled promise of another reporting channel the last we have
heard about section 1057? Of course, the fact that the CFPB has never
announced taking action on the basis of inside information does not mean
that its hotline has not received occasional tips. The Bureau does promise to
allow whistleblowers to request confidentiality or even remain anonymous
to the extent permitted by law.103 Perhaps it opted not to set up a web
portal for employee whistleblowers because the relevant staff members had
their hands full with the tips coming through existing channels. But there
are more likely explanations for the Bureau’s apparent abandonment of the
online portal. An obvious one is that the CFPB did not receive many tips
and lost confidence in section 1057’s ability to entice informants.
If this is the case, the Bureau’s response is partially misguided, as
whistleblowing may increase over time as the Bureau’s reputation develops
and it clarifies standards through rulemaking. But a low volume of initial
tips is not encouraging. As discussed in the following section, a historical
comparison to Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 suggests one reason Dodd–Frank
100 See Alan S. Kaplinsky, Ballard Spahr LLP, CFPB’s Whistleblowers Announcement Is a
Wake-up Call, CFPB MONITOR (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2011/12/20/
cfpb%E2%80%99s-whistleblowers-announcement-a-wake-up-call, archived at http://perma.cc/
F93Y-WR2E (“We do not anticipate a large number of these kinds of whistleblower reports.”).
101 Press Release, supra note 98.
102 Kent Markus, The CFPB Wants You to Blow the Whistle on Lawbreakers, CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/the-cfpb-wants-you-toblow-the-whistle-on-lawbreakers, archived at http://perma.cc/CN5F-3ZPV. The CFPB has
implemented a consumer complaint portal on its website, but as the whistleblower page stresses,
consumer complaints are distinct from whistleblower tips. Id. Incidentally, the web portal has been
the most heavily utilized channel for consumers to submit complaints. See CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE: A SNAPSHOT OF COMPLAINTS RECEIVED 4 ( June 19,
2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201206_cfpb_shapshot_complaints-received.pdf
(explaining that forty-four percent of all consumer complaints were lodged through the CFPB
website, compared to eleven percent over the phone). Consumer usage therefore indicates that the
whistleblower web portal may be a proposal worth reviving.
103 Markus, supra note 102.
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section 1057 may provide a less-than-ideal incentive for whistleblowers in
the short term and illustrates a problem that may sabotage section 1057’s
long-term viability.
III. FIXING A CRACK IN THE INSULATION
Even if the CFPB’s lack of accountability makes some people legally or
politically queasy,104 it responds to one of the chief threats to a healthy
whistleblower program: capture. Some scholars have questioned why we
worry more about capture in this context than in others.105 There are two
good responses to that concern: First, whistleblowers are often disgruntled
employees who are easy to discredit and ignore, making it easier for an
agency to abandon an externally imposed commitment to working with
them. 106 Second, inconsistent administration undermines an agency’s
reputation for responding to tips, and whistleblowers will not step forward
unless they expect law enforcement to take action swiftly. 107 Professor
Richard Moberly credits this type of inconstancy with making the IRS’s
program “dysfunctional,”108 and agency disinterest may explain why the
SEC’s insider trading whistleblower program withered on the vine.109
The CFPB’s structural independence is an important argument in favor
of the enforcement potential of a CFPB-administered consumer financial
104 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing attacks on the CFPB’s lack of
accountability). But see Block-Lieb, supra note 60, at 27 (arguing that locking in a commitment to
consumer financial protection is wise, because such legislation has “diffuse benefits and narrowly
defined costs” that make enforcement challenging).
105 See Casey & Niblett, supra note 11, at 1174-75 (“Our analysis suggests that worries of agency
capture . . . are overemphasized.”).
106 For example, the SEC’s failure to follow up on tips about several high-profile frauds,
most notably Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, inspired scathing criticism. See, e.g., Matt Tiabbi, Why
Didn't the SEC Catch Madoff? It Might Have Been Policy Not to, ROLLING STONE, May 31, 2013,
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/why-didnt-the-sec-catch-madoff-it-mighthave-been-policy-not-to-20130531, archived at http://perma.cc/NT7C-EBD4 (characterizing the
SEC as “aggressively clueless” and noting that the Commission ignored whistleblower Harry
Markopolos’ timely and “extraordinarily detailed” attempt to inform it about Bernie Madoff’s
scheme).
107 See supra note 95.
108 Moberly, supra note 27, at 51.
109 See Vanessa Castellina, Note, The New Financial Incentives and Expanded Anti-Retaliation
Protections for Whistleblowers Created by Section 922 of the Dodd–Frank Act: Actual Progress or Just
Politics?, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 187, 193 (2011) (discussing the SEC Office of the
Inspector General’s assessment of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988’s unsuccessful whistleblower program, an evaluation which concluded that “the SEC did not
follow up with informants regarding their tips” (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC, REP.
NO. 474, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC'S BOUNTY PROGRAM 5 (2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2010/474.pdf)).
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whistleblower program. But there is a crack in section 1057’s insulation—the
requirement that plaintiffs exhaust the DOL’s administrative remedies
before bringing suit.
Section 1057 shares this feature with Sarbanes–Oxley’s defensively
minded whistleblower provision, section 806. A whistleblower who believes
she has been retaliated against must file a complaint with the DOL and
allow the Secretary of Labor an opportunity to investigate the claim before
bringing suit in federal court.110 If the Secretary of Labor concludes that the
claim is without merit, there is an appeals process through the DOL’s
ARB.111 The statutory remedies are also identical: under either cause of
action, a prevailing employee may receive back pay plus interest, reinstatement
at the same seniority level, and compensation for special damages, including
fees and costs.112 In fact, the two provisions are very similar. Section 1057
bears a closer resemblance to Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 than it does to its
Dodd–Frank brethren, Dodd–Frank sections 922 and 748.113 Aside from
nearly identical administrative enforcement mechanisms, section 1057 and
section 806 share a focus on antiretaliation and an absence of statutory
bounty provisions.
A. The Shortcomings of Pre-Amendment Sarbanes–Oxley Section 806
Unfortunately, this is not a promising comparison. Sarbanes–Oxley
section 806 is a provision with an inglorious past. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act
as a whole was tarnished by its inability to forestall the financial crisis, but,
prior to being altered by the Dodd–Frank amendments, Sarbanes–Oxley
section 806 in particular was perceived as providing inadequate incentives
for employee whistleblowers.114
Scholars such as Professor Geoffrey Rapp interpret this as evidence that
antiretaliation protection in general is not sufficient to convince employees
to report violations.115 If this is true, the CFPB’s abandonment of a web

110
111
112
113

12 U.S.C. § 5567(c)(1)(A) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (2012).
12 U.S.C. § 5567(c)(2)(C) (2012).
Id. § 5567(c)(4)(B), (D); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2) (2012).
Compare Dodd–Frank Act § 1057, 12 U.S.C. § 5567 (2012), with Sarbanes–Oxley Act
§ 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
114 See Dyck et al., supra note 11, at 2250-51 (finding that the percentage of employee
whistleblowers in large U.S. fraud cases declined after 2002, and indicating “that [Sarbanes–Oxley’s]
protection for whistleblowers has not increased employees’ incentives to come forward with cases
of fraud”).
115 See Rapp, supra note 95, at 118 (noting that there are “severe counterincentives that can
convince insiders not to bring information about ongoing corporate and financial fraud to light”).
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portal likely demonstrates its loss of faith in Dodd–Frank section 1057,
suggesting that section 1057 is unlikely to attract many tips.
Even if Professor Rapp is mistaken on this point, Sarbanes–Oxley
section 806 demonstrates that the antiretaliation rights available to
whistleblowers are unconvincing. Unfortunately, the same problem that
dragged down Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 threatens to undermine the
future of Dodd–Frank section 1057.
Despite the outpouring of public support for whistleblowers that
accompanied its enactment, Sarbanes–Oxley did a poor job of protecting
informants from retaliation. Simply put, whistleblowers who brought claims
under Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 almost never won. In 2007, Professor
Moberly completed a comprehensive review of administrative decisions that
were produced through the administrative process that claimants under
Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 must satisfy.116 He discovered that the Bush
DOL was a “remarkably one-sided” boneyard for plaintiffs.117 By the time
Professor Moberly repeated his study in 2012, the employee success rate at
the OSHA investigation stage stood at just 1.8% over the lifetime of
Sarbanes–Oxley section 806.118
Professor Moberly and other academics identified a series of specific
flaws in the statute’s language and administration. For example, the regulatory
scheme of pre-Dodd–Frank section 806 included a tight ninety-day statute
of limitations, a political compromise119 that led to the DOL rejecting many
whistleblowers’ claims as untimely. 120 The most crucial problem with
Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 is that the ARB and the DOL’s ALJs have
invented and imported harsh requirements for litigants, such as insisting that
the fraud reported be “material” and aimed at shareholders, or reading
section 806’s requirement that a whistleblower “reasonabl[y] belie[ve]” she is

116
117
118

See Moberly, supra note 25, at 83-90 (outlining the timing of the study).
See id. at 91 (describing the low success rates of whistleblowers at the ALJ and ARB level).
See Moberly, supra note 27, at 29 (noting that OSHA decided in the employer’s favor 488
times between 2006 and 2008 without a single employee victory).
119 See Moberly, supra note 25, at 133-34 (explaining that Senators Chuck Grassley and
Patrick Leahy shortened the original 180-day statute of limitations to “mollify a group of
Republican senators”).
120 See Earle & Madek, supra note 26, at 52 (arguing that there is no policy justification for a
ninety-day statute of limitations, particularly if the goal of the statute is to encourage whistleblowers to
come forward); Moberly, supra note 25, at 132 (“The study’s results indicate that OSHA and ALJs
denied large numbers of whistleblowers Sarbanes–Oxley protection because of the restrictive 90-day
statute of limitations.”); see also King, supra note 26, at 1471 (observing that “ALJs are very firm in
enforcing this ninety-day deadline”).
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reporting a securities violation to exclude whistleblowers who come forward
regarding potential or imminent violations.121
B. Undermining the Lock-In Effect
Dodd–Frank made several amendments to section 806, taking aim at
specific problems such as the statute of limitations. The same corrective
measures were incorporated into Dodd–Frank section 1057. Section 1057
and amended Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 now include a 180-day statute of
limitations.
However, the state of the DOL is probably the most salient change in
the current environment for whistleblowers. David Michaels, whom
President Obama appointed Assistant Secretary of Labor in charge of
OSHA, acknowledged that OSHA’s Whistleblower Protection Program is
“clearly not functioning well.”122 He has since engaged in reforms, including
updating the OSHA investigation manual and relocating OSHA within the
DOL.123 Under the new board of the ARB, which was selected by Secretary
of Labor Hilda Solis, another President Obama appointee, the restrictive
additions to Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 were trimmed away, and plaintiffs
are now winning more cases.124 Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 itself seems to
be enjoying a resurgence under the new guard.125 In 2011, two whistleblowers
won a $2.2 million jury verdict in a section 806 suit.126 More recently, a
former Playboy employee, Catherine Zulfer, collected six million dollars,
the largest verdict ever doled out under the provision.127

121
122

Moberly, supra note 27, at 33.
Id. at 40 (quoting Letter from David Michaels, Assistant Sec’y, OSHA, to OSHA
Personnel ( July 19, 2010), available at http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/Michaels_vision.html).
123 Id.
124 See id. at 43 (noting that the new ARB removed the Bush-era requirement that whistleblowers
“definitively and specifically” articulate a statement of a material securities violation).
125 See generally Miranda Tolar, Whistleblower Claims in the Corporate Context: An Employer’s
Perspective, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIMS: LEADING LAWYERS ON
ANALYZING POTENTIAL CLAIMS, NAVIGATING RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND BUILDING
AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE ( Jo Alice Darden ed., 2010) (outlining the recent amendments Congress
has made to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act “to provide more protection to corporate employees”).
126 See Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., No. 04-0703, 2011 WL 2118637, at *1, *19 (D. Nev.
May 24, 2011) (affirming the $2.2 million jury verdict and ordering the employer to pay an
additional $2.4 million in attorneys’ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest).
127 Special Verdict Form at 2, Zulfer v. Playboy Enters., Inc., No. 12-8263 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
5, 2014); L.A. Ross, Playboy Must Pay $6 Million in Largest Federal Whistleblower Verdict, CHI. TRIB.
(Mar. 6, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-03-06/news/chi-playboy-whistleblower20140306_1_whistleblower-jury-playboy-enterprises, archived at http://perma.cc/34JQ-7HB4
(elaborating on Zulfer’s case against Playboy).
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Changes like this would be helpful over the long term—if they stuck.
Unfortunately, however, the tweaks reflected in Dodd–Frank’s amendments
to Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 are putting out fires instead of preventing
them. The overriding lesson of both Sarbanes–Oxley section 806’s
pre-amendment futility and the sudden uptick in whistleblowers’ postamendment success is, as Professor Moberly puts it, that “[w]e should be
uneasy that the actions of whoever is in power could so easily determine the
success or failure of a whistleblowing system.” 128 Section 1057 still has
plenty of hooks from which future ARB board members can hang obstructions,
including the requirement that a whistleblower have a reasonable belief that
she is reporting a violation of consumer financial law. In short, the DOL
exhaustion requirement undoes much of the good that the CFPB’s structure
could effectuate in terms of sustained commitment to a whistleblower
program.129
IV. CONSUMER FINANCIAL BOUNTY HUNTERS
Depending on how broad the lesson of Sarbanes–Oxley section 806
sweeps, Congress might be able to adequately incentivize consumer financial
whistleblowers by amending Dodd–Frank section 1057. Unfortunately, the
obvious “fixes,” such as transferring investigative and adjudicatory authority
over section 1057’s administrative process to the CFPB or eliminating the
exhaustion requirement entirely, present issues of frivolous litigation and
increased administrative costs, respectively.130 And if, as Professor Rapp
128
129

Moberly, supra note 27, at 45.
See Barkow, supra note 55, at 51 (“If the executive agency has the authority to veto or
dictate the insulated agency’s policies, the other design features of the insulated agency are
meaningless because the insulated agency answers to a political entity that shares none of its
insulating features.”).
130 Transferring OSHA’s Dodd–Frank section 1057 investigation responsibilities to the
CFPB sounds promising at first blush. Aside from encouraging the CFPB to make further
investments in a whistleblower program, transfer would enhance investigative efficiency and
competency. As it stands, a key element for protected activity under section 1057 is the employee’s
“reasonable belief ” that the conduct she reports violated federal consumer financial protection law.
Especially if the definition of the UDAAPs banned by the CFPB continues to evolve over time,
investigators will need experience with consumer financial law and products in order to do a large
part of their job. Even without the reasonable belief requirement, CFPB personnel gain the most
synergistic insight from investigating the entities that they regulate, and giving CFPB personnel
direct information on these claims streamlines CFPB intervention in appropriate suits, such as
where a putative UDAAP is at issue.
The problem with this move, however, is that shifting only investigatory responsibility to the
CFPB does not fully cordon the DOL’s influence. Because the CFPA is an article of federal
consumer financial law and section 1057 is a component of the CFPA and prohibits retaliation in
general terms, the CFPB could use its enforcement powers to directly resolve complaints that its
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argues, antiretaliation provisions are inherently poor motivators,131 these
costly solutions may not generate corresponding benefits. The better course
is to create a Bureau-administered incentive that is less historically dubious
than antiretaliation protection: a system for rewarding informants with
monetary bounties.
I do not discuss the political feasibility of achieving this reform through
legislation here.132 But, in the absence of congressional action, the CFPB’s
own rulemaking power offers another possible method of creating a bounty
system. 133 After outlining the case for bounties, I discuss the CFPB’s
investigators concluded had merit. See 12 U.S.C. § 5567(a) (2012) (“No covered person or service
provider shall terminate or in any other way discriminate against . . . any covered employee.”
(emphasis added)). However, for other complaints, including false negatives, the appeals process
would continue to run through the DOL’s ALJs and the ARB. Truly divorcing Dodd–Frank
section 1057’s exhaustion requirement from the DOL would necessitate not only hiring or
transferring a new contingent of CFPB investigators but also creating a whole new adjudicatory
system within the CFPB for the sole purpose of resolving section 1057 complaints.
Instead of incurring this substantial expense, Congress could simply eliminate the administrative
exhaustion requirement altogether, as it did for claims under the new securities and commodities
whistleblower provisions. For examples of statutes without an exhaustion requirement, see 7
U.S.C. § 26 (2012) and 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012). The chief objection to this approach is that it
opens the door to frivolous complaints that the exhaustion requirement sought to address in the
first place.
An appropriately designed bounty system can avoid both of these problems with a reformed
antiretaliation cause of action. If the CFPB makes the final decision whether to take enforcement
action based on a tip, there is no risk of frivolous private litigation. As for costs, whistleblowers
themselves can be compensated with a percentage of the recoveries that they precipitate, and the
cost of additional CFPB enforcement attorneys pales in comparison to the cost of creating a
miniature DOL exclusively dedicated to Dodd–Frank section 1057.
131 See Rapp, supra note 92, at 113 (arguing that Sarbanes–Oxley has failed “to generate
sufficient incentives for whistleblowers”).
132 That said, regulated industries and lawmakers who represent their interests should
welcome changes that encourage the CFPB to adopt a more reactive approach. Armed with a
productive whistleblower program, the CFPB would be more likely to set clear standards through
rulemaking rather than murky enforcement and supervisory actions. With more consistent access
to inside information, the Bureau would also be more likely to rely on tangible evidence of
wrongdoing and less likely to engage in controversial techniques, such as enforcing ECOA by
means of undisclosed formulae.
133 The Bureau also has less dramatic options available for signaling its commitment to
Dodd–Frank section 1057, but these measures are fairly unsatisfying. For instance, the CFPB
could adopt a policy of exercising its independent authority to enforce section 1057 and use claims
that OSHA deems meritless as a jumping-off point for its own investigation. The Chief of the
SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower has announced his office’s intention to directly enforce the
antiretaliation provisions connected to its program when it has the opportunity to do so. See
Rachel Louise Ensign, Q&A: Sean McKessy, Chief, SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower, WALL ST. J.
RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Sept. 24, 2013, 12:23 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/
2013/09/24/q-a-sean-mckessy-chief-of-the-secs-office-of-the-whistleblower, archived at http://perma.cc/
EK5T-VRFV (declaring that the OWB is “actively looking for ways to be proactive in pursuing,
under appropriate circumstances, a retaliation claim, either as an add-on to an instance where
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rulemaking options and conclude with a brief survey of design concerns that
would be relevant to either a legislatively or administratively created
program.
A. The Argument for CFPB Whistleblower Bounties
An in-house CFPB bounty program, resembling the regimes under Dodd–
Frank sections 748 and 922 for commodities and securities whistleblowers,
would provide three principle benefits.
1. Offering an Effective Incentive
First, such a program would ensure a reliable long-term incentive for
consumer financial whistleblowers. As outlined above, Dodd–Frank section
1057’s antiretaliation cause of action is the only positive incentive federal
law currently offers to encourage such reporting, and its efficacy relies on
the DOL, the agency that disarmed section 1057’s closest historical analogue
for a decade. Although the CFPB’s insulation does not immunize it from
capture by regulated interests,134 the Bureau is well-built to resist the type
there was substance to the underlying report, but also if we are given evidence that a person
reported to us in good faith and it turned out that they were wrong”).
This tactic would become costly and duplicative in the long run, and may not otherwise be
necessary in the immediate future because of the current composition of the DOL. Another, less
resource-intensive option would be for the CFPB to harness its existing amicus program and
participate in suitable proceedings as amicus curiae. See Amicus Program, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/amicus (last visited Sept. 6, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/7JTV-6RU7 (listing all of the cases in which the CFPB participates as a friend of
the court and inviting suggestions for cases in which to submit briefs). OSHA has not finalized its
rules of procedure for Dodd–Frank section 1057 retaliation complaints, but those rules will likely
give the CFPB the right to participate in this way. The analogous rules for complaints under
amended Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 give the SEC the right to “participate as a party or as
amicus curiae at any time in the proceeding” at its discretion. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.108(a)(1) (2014).
Even if the CFPB’s input in some of these cases consists of black letter recitals of consumer
financial law, the filings might send a message to the plaintiffs’ bar. Plaintiffs’ attorneys have some
motivation to monitor Dodd–Frank section 1057, because the statute provides for fee awards to a
successful employee at both the administrative and judicial levels. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 5567(c)(4)(B)(ii) (2012) (granting fee awards at the administrative level); id. § 5567(c)(5)(C)
(granting fee awards at the judicial level). But neither amicus briefs nor direct enforcement
initiatives signal long-term commitment as reliably as would a schedule of guaranteed bounty
payments, and both options require an existing pool of Dodd–Frank section 1057 complaints to
use as a starting point.
134 For example, critics have pointed to Raj Date’s transition from a deputy director position
at the CFPB to a mortgage origination startup as a foreshadowing of such troublesome coziness.
See Nick Summers, A Consumer Hero Returns to Wall Street, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct.
17, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-17/former-cfpb-deputy-raj-date-launchesfor-profit-financial-startup, archived at http://perma.cc/3YT6-QVTD (considering the implications
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of executive influence that compromised DOL’s administration of
Sarbanes–Oxley section 806.135 Providing an additional incentive parallel to
Dodd–Frank section 1057, but administered by the CFPB, would make
consumer financial whistleblowing less likely to wane with shifts in
presidential priorities.
2. Functional Consolidation
Second, a system that allows the CFPB to distribute financial awards to
cooperative consumer financial services employees unites several key facets
of the whistleblowing process within a single agency: (1) the motivation for
making an initial report, as described in the preceding paragraph; (2) a law
enforcer’s ability to take remedial action and acquire expertise in directing
further investigations of potential violations; and (3) a mechanism for
motivating further assistance from informants.
For an illustration of how this consolidation could generate more efficient
enforcement, consider the CFPB’s November 2013 action against Cash
America International, Inc. (CAI).136 The Bureau discovered that CAI was
engaged in robosigning court documents from debt collection suits; that is,
the company ordered its employees to “stamp a lawyer’s signature” on
materials without reviewing them.137 The agency went on to extract an
additional $5 million fine after CAI employees confessed that their managers
had “coached them on what to say to [CFPB] examiners” and “instructed
[them] to shred files and erase calls” while the CFPB examination was
pending.138
It is not surprising that the CFPB’s first public enforcement action
against a payday lender was also the first CFPB enforcement action where
the subject failed to “comply fully.”139 CAI is “one of the largest short-term,
of Washington, D.C.’s revolving door in light of Date’s transition from the public to private
sector). But see David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 531
(criticizing abstract antipathy toward law enforcement officials taking private-sector jobs and
presenting a study of prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of
New York that indicated no correlation between career success and “laxity on regulated industry”).
135 See supra text accompanying notes 128-132 (discussing how Congress could use the lessons
of Sarbanes–Oxley section 806 to amend Dodd–Frank section 1057).
136 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 46, at 11 (describing the CFPB’s enforcement
action against CAI).
137 Danielle Douglas, Payday Lender Cash America Fined Over Claims of Robo-signing, Gouging
Military Members, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/cfpb-fines-payday-lender-cashamerica-for-robo-signing-gauging-military-members/
2013/11/20/23d31f54-520e-11e3-a7f0-b790929232e1_story.html.
138 Id.
139 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 46, at 12.
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small-dollar lenders in the country,”140 yet its internal controls were inadequate
at best. For most payday lenders, the CFPB is the company’s first taste of
not only a federal banking regulator, but of federal supervision in general.141
Some segments of the market, such as tribal lenders,142 had previously
operated outside of state regulation as well.143 The CFPB may encounter
greater obstinacy from these smaller, newly overseen firms as it continues to
address payday lending and to expand its oversight of nonbanks generally.
In this environment, where spoliation of evidence is a genuine risk,
whistleblowers can provide a valuable pipeline for information that would
be ripe for destruction by other internal actors if the Bureau notified the
consumer financial services provider of an imminent examination.144
Standing alone, antiretaliation protection is a poor tool for convincing
employees to go the extra mile and secure evidence for the CFPB. This
conduct could expose the employee to numerous vexations, including
possible civil or criminal liability for “‘stealing’ the evidence used to prove
the employer’s wrongdoing.”145 And although a whistleblower’s “theft” of
140
141

Id. at 11. Cash America is also a publicly traded company (NYSE: CSH).
See Cordray, supra note 15 (noting that “[s]ince most of these businesses are not used to
any federal oversight, [the CFPB’s] new supervision program may be a challenge for them”).
142 Together with legitimate tribal businesses, regulators are concerned that unaffiliated
payday lenders use so-called “rent-a-tribe” schemes to evade state oversight. See Jessica SilverGreenberg & Rachel Abrams, Costly Loans Are Drawing Attention From States, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2014, at B1 (contending that some lenders devise innovative ways to skirt laws); Daniel Wagner,
Six Federal Agencies Are Investigating Online Payday Lenders, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Aug. 8,
2013, 11:12 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/08/08/13145/six-federal-agencies-are-investigatingonline-payday-lenders, archived at http://perma.cc/66TR-6C3F (describing a millionaire motorsport
driver’s involvement in “rent-a-tribe” arrangements).
143 Federal consumer protection laws govern tribal businesses. See CAROLYN L. CARTER ET
AL., CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION: CREDIT CARDS, PAYDAY LOANS, AUTO FINANCE AND
OTHER NON-MORTGAGE CREDIT § 9.6.3.2a (1st ed. 2013 supp.) (“[Tribal] businesses may not
assert sovereign immunity against the United States.”).
144 Cf. Identity Crisis, supra note 13, at 8 (noting that when the CFPB investigates “relatively
small consumer scam[s]” there is a real possibility that the investigation’s subjects will “fire up
their shredders and wipe their hard drives clean before the CFPB’s investigators can collect
evidence of the illegal practices”). The author of the BNA Banking Report, Ronald L. Rubin,
doubts that “the majority” of the entities that the CFPB investigates are brazen enough to destroy
evidence in the face of potential criminal liability for obstruction of justice. Id. However, he
argues that a CID carries no additional deterrent threat in such circumstances, and “the only way
to guarantee document preservation” would be “to have the FBI or some other police force raid
[the company’s] offices.” Id. Rubin was writing in the context of the Bureau’s skeletal whistleblower
program. Improvements to that model, which encourage consumer financial services informants to
cooperate with the Bureau by preserving and expropriating evidence, would provide an alternative
to the dramatic measures to which Rubin alludes.
145 Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of Reform Versus
Power, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183, 186 n.19 (2007) (citing TOM DEVINE, THE WHISTLEBLOWER'S
SURVIVAL GUIDE: COURAGE WITHOUT MARTYRDOM 28-32, 35-36 (1997)).
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nonprivileged, non-trade-secret company documents should be protected
activity under Dodd–Frank section 1057 (at least to the extent that a
whistleblower acts at the CFPB’s direction), an employee who obtains
documents without being discovered by her employer but is later terminated
for other protected activity could find her remedies in a subsequent
antiretaliation suit limited by the “after-acquired evidence” doctrine. 146
Financial awards incentivize further digging and perseverance in the face of
these risks and in the face of management obfuscation generally.147
On a related note, a bounty system that rewards whistleblowers for
continuing to assist the CFPB could mitigate the difficulties that flow from
the rigid bifurcation of the Bureau’s supervisory and enforcement functions.
Although the CFPB houses its Office of Supervision and Office of
Enforcement within the same division, 148 the terms of the Bureau’s
Enforcement Action Process (EAP) ensure that there is “minimal functional
overlap” between the two offices.149 A particularly onerous aspect of the
EAP bans “information gathering contact” between Enforcement attorneys
and persons not on the Bureau’s payroll until the CFPB begins a formal
investigation.150 Because the Office of Enforcement’s preliminary investigatory
options are so limited, the office ends up opening formal investigations with
lengthy, unfocused CIDs that inflict “significant legal expenses” on subjects
as they scramble to prepare for initial discussions with CFPB staff.151

146 See DAVID J. MARSHALL & ABIGAIL COOK-MACK, PURLOINED DOCUMENTS,
CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYER DATA, AND COUNTERCLAIMS IN WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION
CASES 22 (2013), available at http://www.kmblegal.com/publications/purloined-documentsconfidential-employer-data-and-counterclaims-in-whistleblower-retaliation-cases-2 (noting that
“[g]enerally, neither reinstatement nor front pay is considered [an] appropriate [remedy]” when an
employer later discovers evidence of misconduct, such as purloining confidential documents, that
would have justified terminating the employee “if it had been discovered at the time [the
misconduct] occurred”).
147 See Rapp, supra note 95, at 136 (arguing that, although Enron’s management was able to
“block[]” concerned employees in the absence of a “financial incentive [for the employees] to go
public,” a system of monetary awards “offers incentives for whistleblowers to persist even in the
face of deliberate efforts by fraudsters to suppress information about fraudulent activity”).
148 That division is known as the Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending Division
(SEFL). See Identity Crisis, supra note 13, at 1 (describing the organizational structure of the CFPB).
149 See id. at 4 (attributing this result to tension between the “examination model” familiar to
those who head the Office of Supervision, and the litigation-centric approach of the CFPB’s senior
Office of Enforcement staff, who are veterans of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection).
150 Id.
151 Id. at 5; see also 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(c) (2014) (requiring the recipient of a CID and Bureau
staff to “meet and confer” no more than ten days after the receipt of the CID).
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Whistleblowers, however, are exempt from the EAP’s restriction on
pre-investigation contact with extra-agency sources.152 The more information
the Office of Enforcement can convince whistleblowers to gather and
divulge, the less the office’s target selection suffers from its disconnect with
the Office of Supervision. Formal investigations can open with narrowly
tailored CIDs to which recipients can respond at a more measured pace,
without wasting resources on needless production. Furthermore, whistleblowers
can also expose violations of federal consumer financial law committed by
entities that are not subject to CFPB supervision. While the Bureau has the
authority to punish these entities,153 it often has no mechanism to detect their
violations, aside from consumer complaints.
3. Shaping Compliance Culture
In addition to highlighting the evidence-gathering advantages whistleblowers
can offer, the Cash America action also points to the third important benefit
of a CFPB bounty system: spurring the development of a compliant culture
in segments of the Bureau’s enforcement roster that are unacquainted with
government oversight. This benefit, however, comes hand-in-hand with two
serious arguments against bounty programs.
First, critics of the SEC’s Dodd–Frank bounty program worry that
offering a monetary reward for original information will lead to an influx of
spurious or underdeveloped tips, forcing the agency to divert resources to
screening these unhelpful complaints. As Professors Casey and Niblett
suggest, the SEC’s Dodd–Frank whistleblower program responds to a
nonexistent problem: the SEC already received a tremendous number of
private complaints before implementing the program, and, according to the
professors, using bounties to attract more information ignores the real goal
of attracting higher quality information.154
Casey and Niblett’s argument may be a valid critique of the SEC’s
program, but it is less damning when applied to a hypothetical CFPB
152 See Identity Crisis, supra note 13, at 4-5 (pointing out that the Office of Enforcement can
gather information from whistleblowers and consumers before instituting formal proceedings).
153 See 12 U.S.C. § 5563(a) (2012) (authorizing CFPB to conduct hearings and adjudication
proceedings against “any person” who violates federal consumer financial law); id. § 5564(a)
(authorizing the CFPB to take the same steps when bringing civil actions); see also Identity Crisis,
supra note 13, at 3 (noting that like the SEC Enforcement Division, “CFPB Enforcement conducts
a high volume of investigations of individuals or businesses that are not subject to the Bureau’s
supervisory oversight”).
154 See Casey & Niblett, supra note 11, at 1207 (“Encouraging whistle-blowing by allowing
anonymous reporting to the SEC without substituting in other costs[ ] will encourage weaker
information, resulting in information overload for the regulator.”).
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regime. In terms of complainant interest without bounties, the two agencies
stand on very different footing: the SEC is an American institution that
celebrated its eightieth birthday in June 2014, whereas the CFPB is a
“start-up” 155 that turned three in July 2014. 156 Although the Bureau has
succeeded in attracting a high volume of consumer complaints,157 there is no
evidence of comparably vigorous reporting from consumer financial services
insiders.158 Left unbalanced, reliance on outsider complaints will push the
CFPB away from enforcement of fraud-like violations that involve significant
information asymmetries and toward practices akin to its controversial
“disparate impact” approach to fair lending under the ECOA.159 The idea
that a bounty system incentivizes the production of underdeveloped tips,
rather than motivating whistleblowers to collect more quality information,
necessarily depends on the specifics of that system.160 The Bureau’s system
should focus on rewarding whistleblowers for gathering substantiating
evidence and deemphasize the importance of convincing the Bureau to open
an investigation. Requiring more investigative work from whistleblowers as
a prerequisite to larger bounty awards would move the CFPB’s program
closer to the balance of incentives that Professors Casey and Niblett
suggest.
More generally speaking, there is a dearth of empirical support for the
intuition that “having stronger monetary incentives to blow the whistle
155 See DePillis, supra note 30 (explaining how the CFPB “was designed as a Google-era
regulator: a data-obsessed start-up, forever iterating, laser-focused on the safety of consumers
rather than the soundness of banks”).
156 See We’re 732 Days Old: Here’s What We’ve Been Up to, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU
( July 22, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/hbd, archived at http://perma.cc/73W8P82M (listing the CFPB’s accomplishments as of its second birthday).
157 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT:
JANUARY 1–DECEMBER 31, 2013 6 (2014), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_
cfpb_consumer-response-annual-report-complaints.pdf (“Since beginning to accept complaints
[on] July 21, 2011 through February 28, 2014, the CFPB has handled approximately 309,700
consumer complaints. Complaint volume has steadily increased, rising 80% from 91,000 in 2012 to
163,700 in 2013.”). In evaluating this statistical trend, it is important to note that the Bureau has
been periodically opening new categories of products to consumer complaints throughout the
relevant time period. See id. (plotting the dates on which the CFPB opened various consumer
financial product categories to customer complaints, from credit cards on July 21, 2011, to payday
loans on November 6, 2013).
158 See supra Section III.B (discussing changes for whistleblowers after the implementation of
Dodd–Frank section 1057).
159 Letter from Jeb Hensarling, supra note 85, at 2; see also Casey & Niblett, supra note 11, at
1175 (arguing that an agency’s inability to identify high-quality whistleblower tips may “shift
enforcement to other types of cases with less information asymmetry”).
160 Indeed, Professors Casey and Niblett do not object to whistleblower bounties across the
board; they simply argue that a qui tam mechanism balances incentives better than a model that
requires only contacting law enforcement. Casey & Niblett, supra note 11, at 1211.
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leads to more frivolous [enforcement].”161 Even if offering bounties requires
the CFPB to allocate more resources toward implementing screening
measures—such as devising a procedure for cross-checking tips against
consumer complaints, reworking the Bureau’s approach to CIDS, or even
establishing a whistleblower unit within the Office of Enforcement—this
allocation will have salutary consequences. One key difference between the
SEC’s nearly-silent Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
(ITSFEA) program 162 and its so-far-bustling 163 Dodd–Frank program is
that Dodd–Frank “institutionalized whistleblowing in the agency by
creating an Office of the Whistleblower.”164 Agency responsiveness is the
best incentive for informants to report. To the extent that sunk costs,
reassigned staff, and earmarked funds nudge the Bureau toward continued
attention to consumer financial informants, they bolster the Bureau’s
reputation among consumer financial services employees and the plaintiffs’
bar as an enforcer to whom it is worth reporting.165

161 Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by
the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 123 (citing Dyck et
al., supra note 11, at 2246). Professor Rapp bases this conclusion on Dyck and his coauthors’
finding that, despite the lure of False Claims Act bounty awards, healthcare whistleblowers lodge
fewer frivolous claims than whistleblowers in other industries. Id.; see also SEC OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN. OFFICE OF AUDITS, REP. NO. 511, EVALUATION OF THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 23 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/
2013/511.pdf (stating that agency staff responsible for administering existing federal whistleblower
programs “were not particularly concerned that award levels could induce illegitimate claims since
they were confident their review process would weed out illegitimate claims through independent
corroboration of asserted facts”).
162 See Castellina, supra note 109, at 188 (“Prior to the passage of the Dodd–Frank Act, the
SEC had a bounty program for informants who provided the SEC with tips regarding insider
trading.”).
163 See OWB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 82, at 8 (observing that the Commission received
over 3000 whistleblower complaints in fiscal year 2013, as compared to just over 300 complaints in
fiscal year 2011).
164 Moberly, supra note 27, at 52 (citation omitted).
165 Committing resources to follow up on whistleblower tips does not need to entail an
undue limit on the discretionary, line-drawing enforcement activities for which the CFPB has
exhibited a taste. To the extent that the CFPB is unwilling to take away too many resources from
policy-oriented enforcement, it has a mechanism available to outsource the work. Dodd–Frank
empowers state attorneys general to enforce the statutes the CFPB administers. CARTER ET AL.,
supra note 49, § 13.2.6. Cooperation with state attorneys general has been a hallmark of the
CFPB’s early enforcement and supervisory actions, and there is no reason that should change in
the context of a whistleblower program. See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
Federal Consumer Agency to Partner with State Regulators on Supervision of Providers of
Consumer Financial Products and Services, Including Mortgage Lenders, Private Student
Lenders and Payday Lenders ( Jan. 4, 2011), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
newsroom/consumer-agency-to-partner-with-state-regulators (discussing the Memorandum of
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The second pertinent argument against whistleblower bounties also relates
to responsiveness—in this case, the employer’s responsiveness, not that of
law enforcement. Commentators fear that whistleblowers racing to cash in
on “original” information will run directly to the agency, rather than
reporting a problem to management or to the company’s own compliance
personnel.166 Consequently, companies will have no reason to invest in their
own compliance programs. 167
This argument has intuitive resonance, but one could present a competing
story. Bounties might foster, rather than discourage, investment in internal
controls.168 Preliminary evidence related to the SEC’s program supports
this hypothesis.169
Existing research on whistleblower motivation170 indicates that (1) the
threat of whistleblowers circumventing responsive compliance programs is
low, and (2) bounties can nonetheless pressure companies to invest in these
programs. Informants usually act out of a desire to correct misconduct, and
although there is potential for retaliation, they tend to report concerns
internally before going to the government.171 The most common reason
whistleblowers forego internal channels such as company hotlines is because

Understanding signed by federal and state regulators establishing coordination and cooperation for
supervision of consumer financial service providers).
166 See, e.g., Patrick Gnazzo & Joseph Murphy, Summary: An Insider Perspective on Whistleblower
Programs (articulating the fear of “[m]any in the corporate community” that “employees will
circumvent internal reporting channels in a race to obtain bounties”), in FOR WHOM THE
WHISTLE BLOWS: ADVANCING CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND INTEGRITY EFFORTS IN THE
ERA OF DODD–FRANK 10, 10 (Michael D. Greenberg ed., 2011).
167 Id.
168 See Iskra Miralem, Comment, The SEC’s Whistleblower Program and Its Effect on Internal
Compliance Programs, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 329, 332 (2011) (predicting that the bounty
program’s short-term interference with extant compliance mechanisms will improve those
mechanisms in the long run). This is the type of behavior that the CFPB is seeking to encourage
from regulated entities.
169 See Moberly, supra note 27, at 53 (describing “early evidence indicat[ing] that corporations
have strengthened their internal systems out of fear that [Dodd–Frank section 922’s] financial
rewards will entice employees to report to the SEC”).
170 For a summary of the existing research, see supra note 169 and infra notes 171-172.
171 See, e.g., ETHICS RES. CTR., BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON WORKPLACE MISCONDUCT
5 (2010), available at http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/WhistleblowerWP.pdf (describing National
Business Ethics Survey data relating to whistleblowing between 2000 and 2009, which showed
that only four percent of employees who reported wrongdoing contacted someone outside of the
company before reporting internally); Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Whistle-Blowers’ Experiences in
Fraud Litigation Against Pharmaceutical Companies, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1832, 1837 (2010)
(surveying several unsealed federal qui tam cases against pharmaceutical manufacturers from 2001
to 2009 and finding that “[g]enerally, whistle-blowers’ first move was to try to address problems
internally”).
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they do not believe their report will be treated seriously.172 If companies take
meaningful steps to investigate reports, few employees will expose themselves
to the social and professional repercussions that attend external whistleblowing
without attempting to raise the matter in-house.
Nonetheless, Professors Feldman and Lobel’s research into whistleblowing
incentives indicates that people suspect others are most likely to blow the whistle
in return for money.173 If consumer financial products companies believe
their employees are inclined to pursue bounties, they have a stark financial
incentive to invest in internal reporting channels that employees take
seriously enough to use—channels which will reliably relay employee tips to
upper management because CFPB policy proscribes leniency for selfreported violations.174 In this context—and possibly in the securities fraud
context as well—a bounty system is best understood as a means of influencing
corporate governance, not just as an enforcement tool.175
172 See GNAZZO & MURPHY, supra note 166, at 10 (“[T]he most important impediment to
internal reporting by employees tends to be the perception that nobody is really listening.”).
173 See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of
Rewards, Liabilities, Duties and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1202-03
(2010) (“In the absence of a legal duty to report, the introduction of a higher financial reward is
perceived to have the greatest impact on the reporting behavior of others . . . [and respondents]
predicted that bounties would lead to significantly higher whistleblowing activity for nonpeers.”).
174 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. NO. 2013-06 REASONABLE BUSINESS
CONDUCT: SELF-POLICING, SELF-REPORTING, REMEDIATION, AND COOPERATION 2-5 (2013)
(indicating that the Bureau will take into account many factors, including a party’s self-policing,
self-reporting, remediation, and cooperation, when assessing penalties against that party). To date,
the most prominent “whistleblower” that the CFPB’s Office of Enforcement has publically is a
Connecticut mortgage lender, 1st Alliance Lending, LLC. See generally Consent Order, 1st Alliance
Lending, LLC, No. 2014-CFPB-0003 (Feb. 24, 2014), 2014 WL 3685991. 1st Alliance not only
admitted its own culpability for splitting unearned fees in contravention of RESPA section 8(b),
it also disclosed the identity of the hedge fund that was its counterparty in the illegal arrangements.
Id. at 3-4. 1st Alliance paid an $83,000 penalty, or $1000 for each loan connected to a split
origination or loss-mitigation fee. Id. at 4. Gauging the leniency of this penalty is difficult without
knowing the size of the fees involved, but RESPA does provide for fines of up to $10,000 dollars
per violation, as well as damages “equal to three times the amount of any charge paid for such
settlement service.” See 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(1)-(2) (2012).
Although the CFPB bulletin and consent order do not explain what prompted 1st Alliance to
come forward, this is the type of behavior in which a company can be convinced to engage when
employees and affiliates blow the whistle internally.
175 See, e.g., Is Your Company Ready for the New Whistleblower Rules?, TO THE POINT
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, Del.), Summer 2011, at 1, 4, available at http://www.pwc.com/us/
en/corporate-governance/assets/to-the-point-summer-2011.pdf (counseling that the best response
to the SEC’s Dodd–Frank section 922 program consists of a public company’s audit committee
captaining adjustments to company culture, hotlines, investigation action plans, and compliance
department staffing); cf. Rapp, supra note 9, at 62 (calling for the cultivation of internal
whistleblowers as a standard feature of American companies, because whistleblowers’ information
“help[s] ensure more effective management of business firms,” which is “a classic objective of
‘corporate governance’” (internal citations omitted)).
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The discipline whistleblower bounties impose on compliance programs
is particularly valuable in the consumer financial services arena, where
ubiquitous mandatory arbitration agreements coupled with class-arbitration
waivers impede private litigation.176 The CFPB has the authority to ban
mandatory arbitration agreements in contracts for consumer financial
services.177 Proponents of consumer financial services arbitration agreements
argue that banning them would be a drastic misstep. In support of this
argument, they point both to the rise of “consumer-friendly features”178 in
such agreements, such as company-footed arbitration bills, that arguably
“make arbitration more beneficial to the consumer than court litigation”179
and to the economic benefits these agreements provide for consumer
financial products companies by facilitating “streamlined proceedings,
informality, [and] reduced cost.”180 A bounty program offers one way to
compensate for arbitration agreements’ potential to slow the evolution of
compliance programs in the consumer financial services industry without
sacrificing the efficiencies that mandatory arbitration can generate for
consumer financial service providers and their customers.
176 In many industries, private litigation is a key driver of compliance development. See, e.g.,
Sharon Finegan, The False Claims Act and Corporate Criminal Liability: Qui Tam Actions, Corporate
Integrity Agreements and the Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 625, 657
(2007) (exploring the increasing role of private settlements in dictating corporate compliance
programs, particularly in the healthcare industry). However, because creditors fear punitive
damages, costly discovery, and damaging publicity, “[m]andatory arbitration provisions are nearly
universal in consumer credit contracts.” See CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., CONSUMER CREDIT
REGULATION: CREDIT CARDS, PAYDAY LOANS, AUTO FINANCE AND OTHER
NON-MORTGAGE CREDIT § 7.4.1 (1st ed. 2012).
Recent Supreme Court decisions have bolstered mandatory arbitration agreements by affirming
companies’ rights to contractually bar customers from arbitrating their claims as a class. In AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), the Court dealt a “coup de grace . . . to
consumer class actions” by upholding a class arbitration waiver in the face of a California
precedent that declared mandatory arbitration agreements containing such provisions categorically
unconscionable. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012). By a 5-4 count, the Court
found that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California’s rule. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753;
see also Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (rejecting the
argument that class arbitration waivers could be unenforceable on a case-by-case basis where they
make vindicating the customer’s federal statutory rights impractically expensive).
177 Before banning mandatory arbitration agreements, the Bureau must conduct a study of
such agreements and present its findings to Congress. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a)-(b) (2012). See generally
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY RESULTS: SECTION
1028(A) STUDY RESULTS TO DATE (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201312_cfpb_arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf.
178 Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Consumer Financial Services Arbitration: What Does the
Future Hold After Concepcion?, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 345, 346 (2013).
179 Id.
180 Id. at 357.
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This line of reasoning leads to, and answers, a question that arose
regarding the SEC and CFTC programs: 181 should the CFPB make
whistleblowers ineligible for a bounty unless they first report internally, in
order to ensure that companies’ investments in compliance programs do not
go in vain?182 If part of bounties’ effectiveness at attracting investment in
internal compliance programs derives from the need to build employees’
confidence in those programs, such a requirement would undercut the very
purpose of a bounty program.
Questions about the prerequisites for receiving a bounty relate to the
creation and design of a CFPB program, which the rest of this Comment
discusses.
B. Implementing a CFPB Bounty Rule
Relative to its bureaucratic ancestors, the CFPB has “efficient and
straightforward” rulemaking power.183 The Consumer Financial Protection
Act authorizes the director of the Bureau to “prescribe rules and issue
orders and guidance, as may be necessary or appropriate to enable the
Bureau to administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the
Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions thereof.”184 Under
this broad delegation of legislative authority, the Bureau has several avenues
for promulgating whistleblower bounty regulations.
The ideal approach would be to guarantee the whistleblower an adjustable
percentage of any civil penalties the CFPB assesses in reliance on information provided by the whistleblower. The Bureau could accomplish this
by amending its Civil Penalty Fund Rule to allocate the first ten to thirty
percent of penalties the Bureau imposes to whistleblowers who provide
information or other assistance integral to the underlying enforcement
action.185
The CFPA created the Civil Penalty Fund (CPF), which collects the
proceeds of civil penalties received by the Bureau and distributes “payments
to the victims of activities for which civil penalties have been imposed
181 For a further description of this question, see Securities Whistleblower Incentives and
Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,300-01 ( June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249
(2014)) (noting that “[c]ommenters were sharply divided on the issues raised by” the “interplay of
the whistleblower program and company internal compliance processes”).
182 For a summary of the SEC’s response to this issue, see infra note 230.
183 See Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger Agency and Stronger
Laws, 13 WYO. L. REV. 405, 414 (2013) (comparing rulemaking authority of the CFPB to that of
the FTC).
184 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1) (2012).
185 See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.104 (2014) (codifying the CFPB’s current Civil Penalty Fund rule).
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under the Federal consumer financial laws.”186 The Bureau’s current rule
generally requires the CPF’s administrator to direct money toward injured
consumers for “uncompensated harm,” where feasible.187
This rule demonstrates the breadth of discretion Congress granted the
CFPB in distributing civil penalty proceeds. Most saliently, in promulgating
the CPF rule, the Bureau necessarily subordinated the interests of some
injured consumers to the interests of others. For example, in a period where
uncompensated consumer harm exceeds available CPF reserves, the
administrator must pay the most recently harmed class of consumers first.188
But this rule also makes a less obvious judgment call about how to order the
interests of “victims.” The CFPA simply permits the Bureau to make
“payments” to anyone “victim[ized]” by a violation of federal consumer
financial law that provokes a civil penalty. 189 Nothing in the statutory
language limits the Bureau to paying victimized consumers, nor does the
statute confine CPF payments to the amount of a victim’s uncompensated
harm.
The CFPA’s definitions section does not define “victim.” 190 Dictionary
definitions of the term encompass anyone harmed by a given action.191
Under this reading of the term, employee whistleblowers are “victims” of
the federal consumer financial violations they report in at least two senses.
First, violations expose a company to liability,192 which works to the
detriment of all of the company’s employees through layoffs, liquidation, or
other potentially adverse consequences. The harm may be more attenuated
in certain situations than in others, but, again, the CFPA’s terms empower
the Bureau to pay victims from the CPF, not to make them whole or
186 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(2) (2012). The statute also allows the Bureau to use the CPF for
sponsoring “consumer education and financial literacy programs” where “victims cannot be located
or [paying victims is] otherwise not practicable.” Id.
187 See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.106 (2014) (governing the allocation of funds to victims).
188 Id. § 1075.106(b)(1).
189 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(2) (2012).
190 Id. § 5481. The current CPF rule defines victims eligible for payments from the Fund as
those “harmed” by a “violation or violations” for which “a final order in a Bureau enforcement
action imposed a civil penalty.” 12 C.F.R. § 1075.103 (2014).
191 Merriam–Webster offers numerous definitions of “victim.” Two of these focus on the
subject being “cheated or fooled” or “tricked or duped,” which more closely fits consumers in this
context. Victim, MERRIAM–WEBSTER (last visited Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/victim, archived at http://perma.cc/7FV3-TEZ3. However, other
definitions sweep much wider: “a person who has been . . . injured . . . by someone else,”
“someone . . . that is harmed by an unpleasant event,” “one that is acted on and usually adversely
affected by a force,” and “one that is injured . . . under any of various conditions.” Id.
192 At the point where the Bureau divvies up new fines in the CPF, the company or its
insurer has already incurred the CFPB penalty’s cost.
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provide restitution.193 The CFPA also omits any express requirement of
materiality or proximate causation.194
Second, the vast majority of whistleblowers face retaliation from their
employers, and almost all experience painful psychological and social
repercussions.195 Congress recognized this fact in Dodd–Frank section 1057.
Again, there is room for debate about what extent the company’s legal
violation “causes” this type of harm if the statute does not impose an
affirmative duty to report, but the Bureau has a colorable position.
Although the argument for revising the CPF rule to treat whistleblowers
as “victims” may not be overwhelmingly persuasive, courts should afford
the Bureau some leeway because it is interpreting an ambiguous and
undefined term in a statute it administers.196 If consumer financial service
providers challenge the revised rule as arbitrary and capricious under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Bureau’s legal conclusion should
be entitled to Chevron deference.197 This standard of review is, in theory,
193
194

See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d) (2012).
The clearest argument for causation arises in connection with smaller entities, large-scale
illegality, or in situations where employees hold company stock. Serious violations of federal
consumer financial law could bring about penalties large enough to shut down a business or force
it to make layoffs, potentially costing an internal whistleblower her job. At a smaller firm, the
same results could follow from more modest penalties. And at larger, publicly traded businesses,
an enforcement action—or the investing public’s reaction to the announcement of the action or
the underlying illegal conduct—could reduce the company’s value, thereby injuring employee–
stockholders.
195 See Legislative Proposals to Address the Negative Consequence of the Dodd–Frank Whistleblower
Provisions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 59 (2011) (statement of Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Professor of Law,
Univ. of Toledo College of Law) (describing employer retaliation and other consequences faced by
whistleblowers, including “severe social ostracism” and “personal hardship”).
196 If the CFPB concludes that this argument is too tenuous, one alternative would be to
draw whistleblower bounties from other sources of recovery available to the CFPB that do not
share civil penalties’ express restrictions on the disposition of the funds procured. The CPFA
grants the Bureau a wide range of remedies, including disgorgement, money damages, and “other
monetary relief.” 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2) (2012). Although the practice of using these funds to pay
whistleblower bounties stands in tension with the reparative purpose of remedies such as
disgorgement, the SEC’s efforts to stretch disgorgement beyond its equitable roots have received
judicial acceptance. See Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Façade of SEC Disgorgement, 4 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. ONLINE 1, 12 (2013), http://www.hblr.org/?p=3528, archived at http://perma.cc/7W2E-6DNJ
(arguing that disgorgement often functions as “a legal remedy akin to a simple money judgment”
in SEC enforcement cases).
197 See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (articulating the
Chevron test which provides that when a statute is “silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific
issue at hand” the agency “may exercise its reasonable discretion in construing the statute”
(quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984))). For
Chevron purposes, “[a] statute is considered ambiguous if it can be read more than one way.”
AFL–CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
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highly deferential, although empirical studies cast doubt on whether
Chevron’s application actually leads to more courts upholding agency
interpretations.198 Whether the court treats the CFPB’s rule revision under
Chevron’s laissez-faire mandate or under some more strict species of
reasonableness review, the reading of the CFPB’s organic statute at issue
here furthers a cogent policy goal in keeping with the Bureau’s mission to
“prevent evasions” of federal consumer financial law199 and its objective of
consistent enforcement.200 Section 1057 expresses a congressional desire for
the CFPB to foster consumer financial services whistleblowing,201 and data
from the SEC’s OWB demonstrates that financial awards tied to law
enforcement recoveries are an effective way to attract more informants.202
Chevron deference is inappropriate when an agency’s interpretation does not produce a
reasonable policy result. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845. Opponents to a consumer financial
whistleblower bounty program may argue that such a program unreasonably circumvents the
DOL’s place in Dodd–Frank’s statutory scheme. Here, although CFPB-administered bounties do,
in a very broad sense, reduce the Bureau’s reliance on the DOL, they do not truly undercut the
DOL’s role in the Dodd–Frank framework. Under Dodd–Frank section 1057, just as under
Sarbanes–Oxley section 806, the DOL serves as a gatekeeper over private litigation and a watchdog for
whistleblowers with retaliation complaints. Neither of these purposes is usurped or diminished by
adding another incentive for employees to blow the whistle in the first place. If more whistleblowers
come forward, perhaps more will suffer retaliation and thereby increase OSHA’s responsibilities,
but the same is true of any step that the Bureau takes to encourage informants. For example, few
would accuse the CFPB of overreaching when it added dedicated channels for tips.
198 See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 173-76 (2010) (finding that
agency interpretations prevailed 64-73% of the time when courts claimed to be applying Chevron);
see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011) (consolidating studies and finding 60–81.3% affirmance rate under
Chevron).
199 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1) (2012).
200 See id. § 5511(a)-(b) (outlining the CFPB’s purpose and objectives).
201 See id. § 5567(a)(1) (protecting employees’ provision of information to the Bureau by
prohibiting retaliation against whistleblowers in general terms); id. § 5567(d) (rendering such
employee rights unwaivable and immune to mandatory arbitration agreements). The statute’s lack
of a legislatively mandated bounty mechanism, such as those in Dodd–Frank sections 728 and 922,
merely reflects Congress’s decision not to micromanage the resources of an agency that is much
newer than the CFTC or SEC and which has not yet demonstrated the type of inattention to
whistleblowers that would necessitate institutionalization similar to that by the OWB or WBO.
Note that the statute did not even require the Bureau to erect the minimal whistleblower
infrastructure, namely a hotline and dedicated e-mail address, that the CFPB has chosen to
institute thus far. See id. § 5512(c)(4)(B) (merely stating that the Bureau “may gather and compile
information from a variety of sources, including examination reports concerning covered persons
or service providers, consumer complaints, voluntary surveys and voluntary interviews of
consumers, surveys and interviews with covered persons and service providers, and review of
available databases” (emphasis added), but not requiring the Bureau to adopt a particular
methodology of information gathering). That is, Dodd–Frank section 1057 protects reporting but
leaves the means of facilitating such reports up to the Bureau’s discretion.
202 See OWB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 82, at 8 (reporting a 7.9% increase in the volume
of whistleblower tips between fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2013).
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Before judicial review becomes an issue, though, the Bureau’s
rulemakings must satisfy the CFPA’s special procedural requirements.
Generally, these requirements resemble the standard notice-and-comment
obligations that the APA imposes on any informal rulemaking. 203 For
example, although the CFPB does not need to submit rules to OIRA, it
must conduct its own cost–benefit analysis of the proposed rule’s impact on
both “covered persons” and consumers. 204 As part of this analysis, the
CFPA directs the Bureau to assess the rule’s potential to reduce consumers’
access to consumer financial products205—a result which is unlikely to follow
from a rule that facilitates a more reactive CFPB enforcement strategy, as
opposed to prohibiting new categories of activity—and the rule’s impact on
rural consumers,206 which should not be pronounced in this instance.
Similarly, the CFPA instructs the Bureau to confer with the prudential
regulators “regarding [a proposed rule’s] consistency with prudential,
market, or systemic objectives,” 207 but if a regulator presents a written
objection, all the Bureau must do is include an explanation of the regulator’s
concern and of the Bureau’s decision in the rule’s adopting release.208
After satisfying these modest requirements, however, the CFPB faces a
final hurdle that is at least theoretically more daunting: the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) can veto CFPB rules.209 In a paper
published shortly after Dodd–Frank’s enactment, Professor Barkow
observed that this “veto threat appear[ed] to be the greatest limit on the
[Bureau’s] independence.”210 This label made sense at the time, given that
“[m]ost of [FSOC’s voting] members have a long history of favoring the
203 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (establishing procedures for informal rulemaking). Although
this Comment proposes a rule amendment rather than an altogether new rule, a whistleblower
system is not a “logical outgrowth” of the originally proposed CPF rule, so the Bureau will need to
renotice the change. See Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 525,
533 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“An agency adopting final rules that differ from its proposed rules is
required to renotice when the changes are so major that the original notice did not adequately
frame the subjects for discussion.”).
204 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
205 Id.
206 Id. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(ii).
207 Id. § 5512(b)(2)(B).
208 Id. § 5512(b)(2)(C). In addition to these front-end constraints, “significant” CFPB rules
also require a second round of review within five years of their effective date. Id. § 5512(d)(1)-(2).
The Bureau must provide another opportunity to comment and suggest modifications to the rule
during this review. Id. § 5512(d)(3). Following the comment period, the Bureau must publish a
report reflecting its assessment of reasonably available evidence as it relates to “relevant factors,”
including the rule’s “effectiveness . . . in meeting the purposes and objectives [of the CFPA] and
the specific goals stated by the Bureau.” Id. § 5512(d)(1).
209 See id. § 5513(c)(3)(A) (providing for FSOC veto by a two-thirds vote).
210 Barkow, supra note 55, at 78.
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industries they are charged with regulating.”211 For example, the Secretary
of the Treasury chairs the Council, and its other nine voting members
include, along with the director of the CFPB and an independent insurance
expert212 appointed by the president: the chairpersons of the CFTC, Federal
Reserve, FDIC, NCUA, and SEC; the Comptroller of the Currency; and the
director of the FHFA.213
To exercise its veto power, the FSOC must conclude by a two-thirds
vote that the rule in question “put[s] the safety and soundness of the United
States banking system or the stability of the financial system of the United States
at risk.”214 This is a challenging standard; indeed, its stringency has been the
target of recent House of Representatives bills seeking to increase oversight
of the CFPB.215 As a U.S. Chamber of Commerce representative pointed
out at a Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs hearing
regarding such legislation, “rules that threaten the safety and soundness of
some financial institutions, or even an entire sector of the financial system,
but do not arise to the level of posing a systemic risk, would not appear to
qualify” for a veto by the FSOC.216
Concluding that reinforcing Dodd–Frank section 1057’s incentive structure
for consumer financial whistleblowers with bounties poses a systemic risk to
American banking or finance requires some mental stretching. But if the
CFPB believed that FSOC review seriously imperiled its whistleblower
bounty rule, it could make a veto even more difficult to justify by exempting

211 Id. at 75; see also Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 213
(2013) (“[C]ritics of the veto are concerned that many of the FSOC’s members share a common
pro-banking industry bias.”(citing Enhanced Consumer Financial Protection After the Financial Crisis:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 13-15 (2011) (statement
of Adam J. Levitin, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) [hereinafter Enhanced
Consumer Financial Protection])).
212 President Obama appointed S. Roy Woodall, Jr., the former General Counsel and
Insurance Commissioner of Kentucky, to this post in May 2011. S. Roy Woodall, Jr., U.S. DEP’T
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/council/Pages/roy_woodall.aspx (last
updated Oct. 23, 2012, 9:53 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/4H5X-XCJK.
213 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1) (2012).
214 Id. § 5513(a), (c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
215 See Alec C. Covington, Note, Fighting Yesterday’s Battles: Proposed Changes to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 299, 306-07 (2012) (citing bills proposing
modifications of the CFPB, including the Consumer Financial Protection Safety and Soundness
Improvement Act, H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. (2011), and the Communities First Act, H.R. 1697, 112th
Cong. (2011)).
216 Enhanced Consumer Financial Protection, 112th Cong. 90-91 (2011) (statement of Andrew J.
Pincus, U.S. Chamber of Commerce); see also id. (arguing that FSOC “review authority is
unlikely to place any meaningful constraint on the CFPB” and is “essentially illusory”).
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employees of very large depositories, as defined by the CFPA, 217 and
systematically important (nondepository) financial intuitions (SIFIs), as
designated by the Council, from bounty eligibility.218 Bounties add less
value at such institutions, which are more heavily supervised and have been
historically accustomed to regulation, than at the more distant corners of the
CFPB’s enforcement sphere where supervision is more rare and compliance
programs less developed.
C. Design Concerns
In fashioning a whistleblower bounty rule, or enacting new whistleblower
legislation, the drafters should use the SEC’s program under Dodd–Frank
section 922 as a model and award informants a variable percentage of any
recovery that the Bureau achieves in reliance on their information. A
system that relies on the agency to bring enforcement actions, such as the
new SEC program, is preferable to a qui tam mechanism that allows
whistleblowers to sue on the government’s behalf inasmuch as the CFPB
seeks to retain some ability to make policy through enforcement actions.
Additionally, although qui tam systems can provide a desirable check on an
agency with a proclivity for ignoring tips, the CFPB’s structure already
facilitates the consistent pursuit of relevant information.
As for the percentage of the Bureau’s recovery that should be paid to a
successful informant, the guiding principle should be incentivizing whistleblowers to continue cooperating and investigating after contacting the
CFPB and after encountering resistance from management or coworkers.219
One consequence of this strategy is that the Bureau will need a wide
range of permissible award percentages so that it can increase compensation
for informants who go the extra mile to preserve evidence or conduct
further research. The ten to thirty percent guaranteed by the other two

217 See 12 U.S.C. § 5515 (2012) (referring to insured depository institutions and credit unions
with assets of more than ten billion dollars as “very large banks, savings associations, and credit
unions”).
218 See State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127, 135 (D.D.C. 2013)
(explaining FSOC’s authority to designate an institution as a SIFI, where “material financial
distress at the U.S. nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the U.S. nonbank financial company, could pose a
threat to the financial stability of the United States” (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (a)(1) (2012))).
219 For a discussion of the benefits that accompany this approach, see supra subsection IV.A.2.
This goal does not require changing the Bureau’s policy of allowing whistleblowers to remain
anonymous, even if they fail to retain an attorney that the Bureau can contact; informants whose
cooperation can be driven by cash will voluntarily identify themselves in the hopes of being able
to claim an award later.
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Dodd–Frank programs is a sensible range and would be an easy number for
the Bureau to defend against judicial or FSOC review by pointing to
Dodd–Frank sections 748 and 922. If the Bureau or Congress wanted to
limit the amount of money diverted from direct consumer recompense, it
could lower the ceiling from thirty percent to the FCA’s minimum of
twenty-five percent for cases in which the government intervenes. 220
Dropping the cap further to the IRS program’s minimum of fifteen percent
is inadvisable, because in cases with modest but significant recoveries, such
as the minimum one million dollars required to trigger award eligibility
under Dodd–Frank sections 728 and 922, the five percent gap between a
minimum award and a maximum award may represent less than $100,000.221
In other respects, the goal of encouraging whistleblowers to develop
their tips counsels against mimicking the Dodd–Frank section 922 regime.
The SEC’s process for determining the amount of an individual informant’s
award depends on seven nonweighted factors, including “the degree of
assistance” a whistleblower provides the SEC in its investigation,222 the
“significance of the information provided,”223 the timeliness of the whistle220 See EVALUATION OF THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 161, at 24
tbl.5 (comparing the range of permissible whistleblower award amounts, based on a percentage of
the funds the agency recovers, among the SEC, CFTC, IRS, and DOJ regimes).
221 Professors Feldman and Lobel found that “low rewards” of $1000 are inefficient incentives
and may even discourage whistleblowers, whereas “high reward[s]” of $100,000 are far more
effective. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 173, at 1190-92. Continuing with the example of a $1
million base recovery, because the professors’ study does not demonstrate that a $50,000 award is
guaranteed to be ineffectual, further empirical study of whistleblower motivation could shed more
light on the question. See EVALUATION OF THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note
161, at 22 (“[F]ew empirical studies have been done on how monetary award levels influence
whistleblowing behavior.”). However, $50,000 is unlikely to provide sufficient incentive for a
potential whistleblower to come forward, considering the long-term damage that blowing the
whistle tends to inflict on informants’ careers. See id. at 23 (“[H]igh rewards can motivate
potential whistleblowers to come forward because the monetary amount may mitigate the cost of
professional and social sanctions that can result.”). By comparison, the DOL found in 2012 that
the median annual wage for U.S. loan officers was about $60,000. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2014-15 EDITION:
LOAN OFFICERS, available at http://www.bls.gov/ooh/business-and-financial/loan-officers.htm.
One way to deal with the problem of making available only a narrow range of possible
rewards, while still maintaining a low cap, would be to eliminate the ten percent floor. However,
no similar federal whistleblower regime, namely those operated by the SEC, CFTC, IRS, and
DOJ, guarantees awards of less than ten percent. See EVALUATION OF THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM, supra note 161, at 24 tbl.5. The same concerns that weigh against a five percent spread
between the minimum and maximum suggest that a five percent minimum may be ineffectual and
that a meaningful award floor is a key component of a whistleblower bounty system. Id. at 22-23
(paraphrasing the chief of the OWB’s opinion that a “guaranteed award amount mitigates the risk
to whistleblowers’ employment prospects or reputation”).
222 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(2) (2014).
223 Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(1).
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blower’s initial report, 224 and the whistleblower’s interaction with the
company’s “internal compliance systems.”225 According to the chief of the
SEC’s whistleblower office, the Commission has not applied this complicated
formula through “mathematical, scientific, [or] step-by-step process[es].”226
How can a system as rife with ex ante uncertainty as the SEC’s convince
an employee to engage in any of the activities that the system’s component
factors aim to encourage? Instead, the CFPB should determine awards
based solely on the extent of the assistance a whistleblower provides. This
single criterion impounds, to a degree, the considerations behind the SEC’s
“significance of the information provided” factor;227 it also does away with
the unnecessary228 attempt to make award amounts play a role in convincing
whistleblowers to report internally.229
Finally, the Bureau’s program should depart from its sisters’ incorporation
of a minimum recovery requirement for award eligibility.230 An agencycentric model, as opposed to one predicated on qui tam suits, allows the
Bureau ultimate discretion over whether to pursue a tip. Once the Bureau
has enough information to believe it is investigating an inconsequential
violation, it can simply stop investigating. Conversely, if the tip initially
seems important enough that the Bureau decides it is worth following up
with an enforcement action, there is no reason to penalize the whistleblower
for reporting what appeared to be valuable information.
CONCLUSION
A well-designed system of bounty awards for consumer financial
whistleblowers would further the CFPB’s objectives by enhancing the
224
225
226
227
228
229

Id. § 240.21F-6(2)(ii).
Id.
See Ensign, supra note 133.
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(1) (2014).
See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
Confronted by widespread concern over a bounty program’s potential to undermine
companies’ existing compliance departments, the SEC has made several changes to its rules. See 76
Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,300-01 (2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249 (2014)) (explaining the
inclusion of regulatory mechanisms designed to foster internal reporting). Although the Commission
rejected comments urging it to require that whistleblowers report malfeasance to the company
before contacting the agency, it decided to include “whether, and the extent to which, a
whistleblower assisted any internal investigation or inquiry concerning the reported securities
violations,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.2lF-6(a)(4)(ii) (2014), as one of many factors that may increase an
award, and a whistleblower’s interference with internal reporting systems as a factor that may
decrease an award. Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(3).
230 Both the CFTC and SEC programs require a total of at least one million dollars in
monetary sanctions before entitling whistleblowers to a share. 7 U.S.C. § 26(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012); 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012).
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Bureau’s enforcement capabilities—especially to the extent that those
capabilities are divorced from the Bureau’s supervisory functions—and by
accelerating the growth of compliance programs at consumer financial
services companies unaccustomed to regulatory oversight. The system could
also benefit consumer financial service providers by encouraging the Bureau
to undertake less policy-making enforcement, as opposed to following
insider evidence and using rulemaking to set clear standards under which
whistleblowers can confidently report. The Bureau might even have one less
reason to ban mandatory arbitration agreements in consumer financial
contracts, because the threat of whistleblowers could correct for the limitations
such agreements place on private litigation as a motive for companies to
invest in compliance. But even if consumer financial product providers react
poorly to the idea of a government agency paying their employees to rat on
them, a CFPB rulemaking implementing this idea stands a fighting chance
of surviving FSOC and judicial review. Either Congress or the Bureau
should exercise its lawmaking power to ensure that whistleblowers have a
reliable incentive to report infringements of federal consumer financial law,
now and in the future.

